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 ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION: A CASE OF INDONESIA 
 
By 
 
Maman Suhendra 
 
 
 
Using 214 out of 440 data set in 2004, it is found that most of local 
governments in Indonesia showed poor performance in generating local own 
revenues. Some reasons can explain this situation. Beside the weak local 
taxation power, the dominant role of central government in revenue-
generating also led to the poor performance. However, the Indonesian 
decentralization is still in process toward the more ideal form. The “big-bang” 
decentralization approach has changed one of the most centralized countries 
into one of the more decentralized ones without any significant interruption. 
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 CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
I.1 Background 
Indonesia has implemented decentralization since January 1, 2001. Upon a 
radical and rapid decentralization program, regional autonomy is 
transforming one of the most centralized countries in the world into one of 
the more decentralized ones. If managed well, Indonesia will benefit greatly 
from decentralization.   
The transition to a significantly more decentralized mode of 
governance was smooth. Many indicators showed the well-going transition 
process. First, local governments assumed responsibility for their new 
functions as scheduled. More than 2.5 million civil servants were successfully 
reassigned to the jurisdiction of sub-national governments. Second, the central 
government has continuously increased the pool of resources transferred to 
sub-national governments, both in relative and absolute terms. Third, in 2004 
the second round of democratic elections, at both national and sub-national 
levels took place without any major interruptions and local governments are 
now headed by democratically elected mayors. Finally, at the same time, the 
most significant risks associated with decentralization were minimized. The 
transition also did not result in a breakdown of service delivery chains, 
neither triggered macro-economic instability. However, there are some
 1 
 crucial issues come into consideration such as the weak local taxing power, 
the controversial intergovernmental transfers, and the low local accountability 
for service delivery. 
 
I.2 Objectives of the study 
The objectives of this study are to examine the recent fiscal decentralization 
process in Indonesia and to identify the problems arisen by the 
decentralization program. Several recommendations will be suggested as 
policy alternative for the government, both national and sub-national level. 
More specifically, this study aims: 
1. To provide a brief description of the fiscal decentralization process in 
Indonesia since the beginning up to the recent. 
2. To assess the current fiscal decentralization status in Indonesia. 
3. To understand the local government (district-level) financial ability.  
4. To figure out some issues and problem in the fiscal decentralization 
program. 
5. To give several recommendations on the problems arisen in the fiscal 
decentralization program.   
 
1.3 Methodology 
Methods used to examine the study’s objectives are both descriptive 
qualitative and quantitative methods, in that all information and data 
collected are critically examined and described in order to achieve the 
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 research objectives. Type of data collected is secondary data. The secondary 
data is collected from institutions and agencies including Ministry of Finance, 
National Development Planning Agency, and Central Statistics Agency at 
provincial and regency/municipality levels. The purpose of collecting 
secondary data is to provide a description of the fiscal decentralization trend 
and progress of local governments since 2001. Others related information and 
secondary data are also collected from many sources. 
 
1.4 Outline of the Study 
The outline of the thesis is divided into five chapters. The second chapter 
deals with the theoretical concept of fiscal decentralization. It provides an 
overview of the basic concept of decentralization. Furthermore, it guides to 
the ideal view of decentralization.  
Chapter three examines the fiscal decentralization in Indonesia. In this 
chapter, a brief trend and progress of the Indonesian fiscal decentralization 
will be discussed. This chapter will lead to the concise (but adequate) 
understanding in the decentralization program from the past up to the recent.  
Chapter four then examines how to manage the fiscal decentralization 
better for Indonesia context. Lessons, issues, and problems will be discussed, 
so that it will be clear how to optimize the benefit of fiscal decentralization to 
the Indonesians. 
Finally, chapter five discusses conclusion and recommendation for the 
better decentralization program. It will figure out the existing crucial issues in 
 3 
 the Indonesian decentralization policy. Some recommendations then will be 
suggested as alternatives for the future decentralization policy.  
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 CHAPTER II 
THEORITICAL CONCEPT 
 
 
II.1 Decentralization: Pros and Cons 
Decentralization has been proposed as a way of managing conflict that arises 
from politicized cultural pluralism (Crook 2002). Rubinfeld (1994) quoted that 
decentralization allows individuals a variety of bundles to choose among, as 
well as two means of expressing preferences: voting within a jurisdiction and 
migrating between jurisdictions. The advantages of decentralization 
correspond to the advantages of the competitive market system; to the extent 
that there exists competition, it can be expected that decentralization 
outcomes will be economically efficient because sub-national governments are 
better positioned than central government to deliver public services as a result 
of information advantage. Therefore, decentralization has been promoted not 
only to accommodate cultural diversity but also to enhance democracy, 
mollify separatist tendencies, help restrain a central government from 
excessive concentration of power, foster economic development, improve 
government efficiency, and facilitate modernization. These powerful 
arguments help explain why decentralization has become so popular in the 
recent decades.  
Some, however, have advanced counterarguments that challenge some 
of the promising conclusions or, at least, outline conditions in which 
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 decentralization could be less attractive policy (Tanzi 1995). As stated by 
McLure (1995), decentralization is not a panacea. It is subject to limitations, 
many of which Tanzi (1995) described. In fact, fiscal decentralization tends to 
detach spending decision further from taxing decision. Tanzi (2000), 
Prod’hume (1995), and Alesia and Perotti (1995) warned that sub-national 
governments may overspend in anticipation of receiving additional resources 
from general purpose grant. Geographically dispersed interests also present 
the danger that some sub-national governments to the central government 
could collude to extract more resources from general purpose grant allocation. 
Thus, they point towards efficiency and equity considerations whereby 
decentralization could lead to problems of macroeconomic management. 
Therefore, if decentralization is done badly, it could cause undesirable 
consequences, leading to macroeconomic disequilibrium, exacerbating 
regional differences and conflicts, reducing welfare, and economic efficiency. 
But if done well, it could promote many economic benefits as well, producing 
greater efficiency, responsiveness, and accountability in the service delivery 
desired by citizen. Moreover, it could improve welfare by increasing citizen 
participation in decisions that affect them. 
Prud’homme (1995) described that decentralization is fashionable 
today. Many discussions about centralization and decentralization relate with 
capitalism and socialism. The trick of Marxist economist was so simple. They 
did not compare actual capitalism with actual socialism – and thus they had 
an easy time to prove the socialism’s superiority. Similarly, many people 
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 today compare actual centralization with ideal decentralization. They see that 
in many developing countries, centralization has failed to deliver welfare and 
democratization process to society. They look at theories of decentralization, 
mostly based on the US, Canada, and European countries experiences. They 
conclude that decentralization is highly desirable. On the other hand, their 
perception of failures of centralization is much more acute in Latin America, 
Africa as well as East Asia countries. As stated by Rubinfield (1994) that the 
assumption of competitive market system in which public goods and services 
are provided in multiple jurisdictions is not equivalent to the model of the 
perfectly competitive economy. Thus, the miserable consequence that must be 
anticipated is decentralization does not ensure efficiency.  
Tanzi (2000) claimed that, in all decentralized countries, similar 
problems tend to arise. He concludes that decentralization has not worked 
well, except in the most developed countries such as Canada, Germany, 
Switzerland, and the United States. The question then, the political 
economists leave with a difficult choice; should they support a decentralized 
fiscal economy without the first-best welfare theorems, or should they urge 
centralization which introduces a new set of political complication and a new 
set of potential inefficiency? In addition, the World Bank (2001) also warned 
that the risks of decentralization may lead to the following situations:                    
− Macroeconomic stability is threatened by lack of fiscal discipline at 
decentralized level leading to higher government debt. 
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 − Inefficient service provision at local level due to decentralization of 
corruption, unqualified staff, and unbridled spending by local authorities. 
− Unequal development opportunities for regions (and for individual 
population groups in the region) due to different costs of service provision 
in the regions despite the same tax revenue base and lack commitment of 
decentralized government agencies to poverty reduction and 
compensatory social transfer payment.  
− Developing democracy, securing peace, and finding long-term solutions to 
conflict are jeopardized by nepotism and consolidation of local elite, 
increasing of local corruption, insufficient consideration of the losers in the 
decentralization process, dissatisfaction within population due to 
deteriorating local service provision and perpetuation of ethnic divisions, 
reinforcement of autonomy movements, weakening of central government,  
and new lines of conflict or exacerbation of ongoing conflicts, even 
hostilities. 
Based on the above controversy arguments, although decentralization 
may be rather simplistically defined as opposite of centralization, the concept 
is far more complex in reality, not last because in the real world perfect 
decision autonomy and hence pure decentralization do not exist (Leonard 
1982). Decentralization then must be understood as a process, rather than as a 
final goal or objective that can be fully attained in a set period of time. Instead 
of being something that can be accomplished, it must be regarded as a series 
of measures that are followed in an attempt to eliminate or at least to reduce 
 8 
 over concentration.  
 
II.2 Economic Rationale of Decentralization  
The fundamental theorem of welfare economics – Adam Smith’s “invisible 
hand” – implies that in the absence of market failure, the economy will be 
Pareto efficient. Individuals, acting in their own self-interest, will make 
decisions that lead to Pareto efficiency. Competition among producers leads 
them to supply the goods that individuals want at the lowest possible cost. 
An analogous argument can be made for the provision of local public 
goods and services by state and local governments as distinct from federal 
government. It is argued competition among communities will supply and 
produce goods and services in an efficient manner. The theory of fiscal 
federalism suggests that decentralization improves public service delivery 
because of greater allocative efficiency (matching public goods to local 
preferences), as well as improved productive efficiency (in part because of 
greater accountability, less bureaucracy, and better knowledge of local costs), 
and better cost recovery (greater willingness of citizens to pay fees and taxes 
for improved public services). Against this, some have argued that 
decentralization may lead to local decisions that have adverse inter-
jurisdictional spillovers and undermine national policy objectives, and that 
the advantages of greater authority for local government could be offset by 
elite capture.  
The allocative efficiency analysis (Oates 1972) holds that local 
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 governments will likely be better able to match public goods to local 
preferences than will higher-level governments. The sub-national 
governments are closer to the people than the central government. They are 
thought to have better information about the preferences of local populations 
than the central government (Hayek 1945, Musgrave 1959). Hence, they are 
expected to have better information about variations in demands for goods 
and services. Moreover, under decentralization authority moves to 
jurisdictions that encompass less social diversity and fractionalization. For 
these reasons, sub-national governments are also considered to be more 
responsive than central government. 
 Another strand of the argument is that decentralization is thought to 
increase the likehood that governments respond to the demand of the local 
citizens by promoting competition among sub-national governments. This can 
be obtained from a model developed by Charles M. Tiebout (1956). Tiebout 
points out that level and mix of local expenditures and taxes are likely to 
exhibit wide variations among local political jurisdictions. Therefore, many 
citizens will choose to live in communities whose government budget best 
satisfies their own preferences for public services, given that they are not 
restricted in their mobility among communities. Thus, government 
expenditure and revenue patterns tend to be set on the local level; and the 
mobile citizens maximizes his well-being by choosing to live in some 
particular political jurisdictions. 
Tiebout was originally concerned with the problem of preference 
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 revelation. While individuals reveal their preferences for private goods 
simply by buying goods, how are they to reveal their preferences for public 
goods? When individuals vote, they choose candidates who reflect their 
overall values, but they cannot express in detail their views about particular 
categories of expenditures. Only limited use of referenda is made in most 
states. And even if individuals were asked to vote directly on expenditures for 
particular programs, the resulting equilibrium would not, in general, be 
Pareto efficient. Tiebout argued that individuals could “vote with their feet”, 
that their choices of product reveal their preferences for private goods.  
Tiebout’s model suggests that competition among communities is not 
only healthy, but necessary to attain Pareto optimality. But there is another 
view of competition among communities which is far more negative. This 
view sees different communities competing to attract business, with the 
associated tax base and employment opportunities. Gains in one community 
are partly at the expense of losses in other communities. But more generally, 
the competition to attract businesses is the ultimate beneficiary. In this 
perspective, it would appear preferable for communities to agree not to 
compete. People would congregate together, and services would be provided 
at minimum cost. No cost differences could persist across localities offering 
identical services because people would naturally gravitate from high-cost to 
low-cost owns. In effect, the market for local services would be perfectly 
competitive (Tresch 1981; Hyman 1993; Stiglitz 2000).   
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 II.3 Fiscal Decentralization Requires Significant Local Government Taxing 
Power 
Fiscal decentralization should be viewed as a comprehensive system. The 
system covers both necessary and desirable conditions. The necessary 
conditions include: 1) elected local council; 2) locally appointed chief officers; 
3) significant local government discretion to raise revenue; 4) significant local 
government expenditure responsibilities; 5) budget autonomy; and 6) a hard 
budget constraint transparency. In addition, the desirable conditions 
comprise: 1) freedom from excessive central expenditure mandates; 2) 
unconditional transfers from higher-level governments; and 3) borrowing 
powers.    
Voters will hold their elected officials more accountable if local public 
services are financed to a significant extent from locally imposed taxes, as 
opposed to the case where financing is primarily by central government 
transfers. To do so, the tax must be visible to local voters, large enough to 
impose a noticeable burden, and the burden must not be easily imported to 
residents outside the jurisdiction (Bahl 1999). 
Furthermore, to capture the benefits of fiscal decentralization, Bahl 
(1999) suggested that there must be significant local autonomy given not only 
on the expenditure side but also on the taxing side. If local governments do 
not have the power to set tax rates, then their officials cannot be held fully 
accountable by voters for the quality of public services delivered. In addition, 
it is also necessary for local councils and chief officers to be elected. Otherwise, 
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 they will not be accountable to the local voting population, and the efficiency 
gains of decentralization will be lost.     
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 CHAPTER III 
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION IN INDONESIA 
 
 
III.1 Long Way toward Decentralization 
Indonesia is a nation of huge territorial area. It has not only enormously 
diverse ethnic and cultural groups but also different resources endowments 
from one region to another. As a consequence, the economic development 
levels differ considerably. In all this diversity, Indonesia has sought to build 
nationhood since its independence in the form of unitary state, with a strong 
sentiment of aversion towards the notion of federalism deeply rooted in its 
history of struggle for independence. 
However, given the vastness of, and diversity in, the country, the need 
for decentralizing government function has long been recognized, although 
with a varying intensity. There existed fluctuation between decentralization 
and centralization in the political thinking and sentiment. But, generally 
speaking, in the earlier days of Republic, the attempts made have been mostly 
for deconcentration of government functions to satisfy diverse regional needs. 
 In 1970s, there was a more serious effort to promote regional 
development and to decentralize as a means of doing so. Following the MPR 
State Guidelines and the second 5-Year Development Plan for 1973-1978, Law 
5 of 1974 on Regional Autonomy was passed. However, the effort was 
brought to an end. The law was never followed up by any government 
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 regulation for implementing it, in spite of the fact that the next third 5-Year 
Plan also gave pertinent emphasis to regional development. 
 Law 5 of 1974 has been the principle means by which Indonesia’s 
regions have been governed for almost 30 years. Before the decentralization 
policy of the late 1990s, the organizing principle in intergovernmental 
relations was strictly hierarchical with the central government exercising 
significant control not only over the appointment of local officials but also 
over the use of funds for each sub-national government. Sub-national 
governments mainly functioned as implementing agencies of national policies 
and programs. As a result, officials in local governments faced strong political 
and fiscal incentives to be accountable upwards to superiors at higher levels 
of governments rather than to their communities. With regard to the 
performance the highly centralized fiscal structure increasingly contributed to 
reduce accountability, adversely affected the rates of return on public sector 
projects, and constrained the development of local institutions (Van den Ham 
and Hady 1998). As Dick and Jaya observed, ”…. despite initial high 
expectations, Law 5 of 1974 did not reverse the trend towards the 
centralization of political and financial power ….” (Jaya and Dick 2001).  
 In addition, Law 5 of 1974 emphasized autonomy in the second level of 
regional (i.e. regency/municipality) governments since this level was closer, 
in general, to local society than the central government. Therefore, 
regency/municipality in theory played an important role in providing 
services to the public. However, due to the highly hierarchical structure of the 
 15
 Indonesian government at that time, this law did not work well and seemed 
to be useless. The Regional Assembly (DPRD) had no power as a community 
agent in representing public interests. In addition, most government 
expenditures did not match with public needs and preferences. As a result, 
the local people kept their distance from officials and considered them as 
outsiders. That’s why it was difficult for the local people and government 
officials to develop a functional relationship and cordial communications 
(Matsui and Kuncoro 2003).  
The figure of inter-governmental relationship under law no. 5/1974, or 
the so-called “old system,” can be described as follows:  
Figure III.1 
Inter-governmental Relationship under the Old System 
 
 
President 
Minister of Home 
Affairs Other Ministers 
Governor Provincial Parliament 
District/City 
Parliament 
District Chief 
/Mayor  District Office 
County Chief 
Village Head Ward Head 
 Provincial Office 
Sub-District Office 
Source: Matsui and Kuncoro (2003) 
This chart shows the clear vertical-order relationship. By exploiting this 
relationship, the central government could control regencies/municipalities. 
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 Such a top-down approach, from center to province, from province to 
regency/municipality, from regency/municipality to sub-district/county, 
and from sub-district to ward or village, was the common means by which 
policies had been implemented. Even though provincial and district 
government had local autonomous functions, final decisions were still 
determined by the central government. Provincial governments received tasks 
from the central government, which were delegated downwards to the 
regency/municipality level.  These were then further delegated downwards 
to the sub-district level, which finally delegated them to the village/ward-
level.  
In conclusion, under Law 5 of 1974 the central government was the 
most powerful institution, and the country became highly centralized since 
the Minister of Home Affairs (as the central government representative) 
controlled all regional affairs and activities. Furthermore, at the regional level 
governors had great stature as the heads of territorial units and enjoyed 
higher positions than the heads of district government.  As the only executive 
branch manager in every region, the governors had the authority to control, 
manage, lead, supervise, as well as coordinate subordinates in their region.  
Laws had been used as instruments for the government to dictate and order 
the lower levels of government or society. Laws were utilized for political 
purposes; therefore at that time, Indonesia was far from democratic. Despite 
of the implementation of decentralization, first-level regional governments 
and even second-level regional governments had limited authority to 
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 organize and manage their own regions or districts. In fact, the objective of 
delegating increased responsibility to the first and second level of regional 
governments was to implement centralization from the center. It was also 
used by the central government to mobilize local resources without allowing 
local governments to manage and organize their own resources.  
Law 22 of 1999 on Local Government Administration and Law 25 of 
1999 on Central and Local Fiscal Balance have changed the inter-
governmental relationship. These two laws are used as the legal basis for the 
decentralization process in Indonesia by establishing a stronger role for 
district-level governments (regencies and municipalities) as opposed to 
province-level governments (Brodjonegoro and Asanuma 2000). Since Law 22 
of 1999 was enacted, Indonesia has changed drastically from a highly 
centralized government to a very heavily decentralized system (Usui and 
Alisjahbana 2003).  
 
III.2 Fiscal Decentralization: Objectives and Recent Status  
In Indonesia, the implementation of the fiscal decentralization program are 
intended to: (1) increase national allocation and regional government 
efficiency; (2) meet regional aspirations, improve overall fiscal structure, and 
mobilize regional and therefore national revenues; (3) enhance accountability, 
increase transparency, and expand constituent participation in decision-
making at the regional level; (4) lessen fiscal disparities among regional 
governments, assure the delivery of basic public services to citizens across the 
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 country and promotion of government efficiency objectives; and (5) improve 
social welfare of Indonesians. 
Law 22 of 1999 eliminated the hierarchical relationship between 
provincial and district governments. The regency/municipality governments, 
so-called Kabupaten and Kota, have more authority to govern their own 
districts. As government has three important functions (i.e. stabilization, 
distribution, and allocation), the central government will take responsibility 
for the first two functions, while regional governments (provinces and 
districts) will implement the third function.  
According to Law 22 of 1999, district governments have total 
administrative authority except for five sectors: 1) defense and security, 2) 
monetary and fiscal policy, 3) diplomacy, 4) religion, and 5) judiciary. Local 
government authority covers all sectors other than those conducted by the 
central and provincial governments (Usman 2002).  At the other side, the 
autonomous authority of provincial governments includes power over 
matters that cannot be or have not been handled by the districts. These 
include inter-district government coordination as well as control over certain 
other fields of governance. The provincial administrative authorities include 
all administrative authority given to governors. Moreover, according to 
Government Regulation 25 of 2000, the central government only creates 
decisions and planning related to the principal and basic things (policy and 
guidance), while provincial governments create more concrete plans for 
broader regional development (Matsui and Kuncoro 2003).  
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 As stated by Smoke (2002), even though many decentralization laws 
are officially promulgated, the central government (especially certain 
ministries) is still reluctant to transfer its authority fully to local governments. 
Theoretically, the hierarchical relationship between provincial and local 
governments, after inaugurating Law 22 of 1999, has been eradicated, and all 
local governments have become fully autonomous and responsible for 
planning, management, financing, and delivery for various sectors. However, 
although provincial governments also act as autonomous regions, they still 
maintain their hierarchical relationships with the central government (Usui 
and Alisyahbana, 2003). Figure 2.2 describes the inter-governmental 
relationship under the new system.  
Figure III.2 
Inter-governmental Relationship under the New System 
 
President 
Minister of Home 
Affairs Other Ministers 
Governor 
Provincial 
Parliament 
District/City 
Parliament 
District Chief 
/Mayor 
County Chief 
Village Head Ward Head Village Parliament 
 
Source: Matsui and Kuncoro (2003) 
Law 22 of 1999 has changed the nature of vertical linkages in the government 
system. According to this law, the hierarchical relationship between 
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 provincial and district government (regency/municipality) is no longer clear. 
The implementation of deconcentration 1  has occurred only up to the 
provincial level, in which provincial governments cannot overstep their 
responsibilities by ordering district governments to take certain actions. 
Compared to the old system, the structure of local government 
organization in the new system has changed quite substantially. Some district 
governments are becoming larger while others have grown smaller. By this 
fact alone, we can observe that the uniform local government organization of 
the past no longer exists today. Every regency/municipality has a different 
organizational structure. In addition, because of decentralization, provincial 
governments are not as powerful as before, while local governments 
(regencies and municipalities) play a more important role in planning and 
development due to their proximity to the local populace. 
Even though decentralization has continued since 2001, and local 
governments have the higher priority, most of their sources of funding are 
still dependent upon the central government. In fact, dependency on the 
central government has increased since the start of decentralization. Monetary 
transfers, in nominal and real values, from the central government to the sub-
regions increased from FY 2001 to the recent FY 2005, even though the central 
government’s expenditures did not decrease.  
 
 
                                                          
 1 Deconcentration is a delegation of authority from the Government or Head of the Territory 
or Head of the Vertical Office of the Government to its government officials (Law 25 of 1999). 
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 Figure III.3 
 
The Contribution of Intergovernmental Transfers 
on Sub-National Revenues
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As depicted by Figure III.3, the transfers from the central government, 
consisting of shared revenue, general allocation fund (DAU), and special 
allocation fund (DAK) are the major sources of funding for sub-national 
governments. The figure shows that the districts are more relied on the 
intergovernmental transfers than the provinces. On average, the districts 
relied almost 90 percent on the intergovernmental transfers to fund their 
expenditures. On the other hand, the provinces relied only about 55 percent 
on average on the transfers. In addition, as can be seen in the following table, 
the total national spending for the sub-national levels increased during the 
five years implementation of the decentralization.   
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 Table III.1 
 
Fiscal Year
Sub-
National 
Spending 
(Rp trillion)
GDP (Rp 
trillion) % of GDP
National 
Revenues 
(Rp trillion)
% of 
National 
Revenues
National 
Spending 
(Rp trillion)
% of 
National 
Spending
2000 32.9 997.0 3.30 205.6 16.00 220.8 14.90
2001 82.4 1615.7 5.10 305.2 27.00 355.2 23.20
2002 94.5 1688.0 5.60 302.0 31.30 343.8 27.50
2003 116.9 1948.0 6.00 336.2 34.77 377.5 30.96
2004 119.0 2017.6 5.90 349.9 34.02 373.4 31.88
2005 129.9 2201.7 5.90 378.2 34.35 392.8 33.07
Source: DJAPK, Ministry of Finance
Sub-National Spending in the State Budget
FY 2000 to 2005
 
 
Furthermore, according to Usui and Alisjahbana (2003), the key 
objective of decentralization is to make public service distribution more 
responsible for fulfilling local needs by moving public decisions closer to 
society. To do so, there are two principles that must be satisfied: (a) Functions 
should follow capacities. This implies that local governments should have 
enough human resources capacity to fulfill their newly delegated functions. 
(b) Revenues should follow functions. This means that there should be a 
reasonable balance between expenditure responsibilities and revenue 
instruments available to local government. 
According to Law 25 of 1999, afterward revised by Law 33 of 2004, 
there are several revenue instruments that can be used to fund the 
expenditure assignments. Among the revenue instruments, transfers still 
remain the main source of local government revenues, but as will be 
discussed later that the current system relies primarily on untied transfer 
(general allocation fund – the DAU) over which local governments have full 
discretion. Specifically, the current revenue framework defines four principle 
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 revenue categories (1) Regional Own Revenues, consisting of tax and non-tax 
revenues; (2) the intergovernmental transfers, consisting of the shared taxes 
and revenues, the general allocation grant (DAU) and the special allocation 
grant (DAK); (3) loans and other forms of local borrowing; and (4) other local 
revenues. The main trust of the decentralization policy was on the devolution 
of expenditure responsibilities. The tax assignments remain largely 
unchanged by the decentralization policy. All significant tax bases, including 
value added tax (VAT), personal, and corporate income taxes remain under 
the control of the central  government.  
 In this and next chapter, regional own revenue and intergovernmental 
transfers will be discussed deeper since their relatively importance in 
understanding the Indonesian fiscal decentralization policy.  
Table III.2  
The Regional Budget Composition  
 
Revenue Side (1)
Regional Own Revenue xxxxx
Intergovernmental Transfers xxxxx
Others xxxxx xxxxxx
Expenditure Side (2)
Various Kinds of Spending xxxxxx
Financing Side (1)-(2)
Various Kinds of Financing xxxxxx
REGIONAL BUDGET
 
Source: Law 25 of 1999  
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 III.3 Regional Own Revenue (PAD) 
Local taxing power could be reflected in the regional own revenue. In the era 
of decentralization the revenue from this source, ideally, must be increasing 
over time.  However, some empirical evidences showed that the regional own 
revenues from local governments in Indonesia were still very small compared 
to the total local revenues. 
Table III.3 
The District Own Revenue Contribution from Total Revenues 
Before and After Decentralization Era 
 
98/99  99/00  Average 2001 2002 Average
Java 14.2 12 13.1 8 13.2 10.6
Non Java 8.5 8.2 8.4 6 7 6.5
Java plus Non Java 10.6 9.8 10.2 6.7 9.4 8.1
After Desentralization (%)
Region
Before  Desentralization (%)
 
Source: Bapekki, Ministry of Finance 
 
In the beginning period of decentralization, the average regional own 
revenue contribution was decreasing. Overall, the contribution before 
decentralization was 10,2 from total revenue while after decentralization was 
8.1 percent. It means that there happened a 2.1 percent decrease in the own 
revenue contribution. In other words, the fiscal ability to fund expenditures 
decreased in the beginning period of decentralization. However, in the 
decentralization era, the nominal amount of own revenue increased 
significantly compared to periods before the decentralization era. The average 
own revenue before decentralization was Rp 7.9 billion. This amount changed 
to Rp 21.5 billion in the decentralization era (170.2 percent increase). Before 
decentralization, the own revenue growth was only 7.7 percent, while in the 
decentralization era was 68.3 percent. This fact shows that the local 
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 governments have done significant efforts to find out the revenue sources 
seriously.  
 It is important to note that the non Java region showed lower efforts 
than Java region. This is because the economic activities in Java are much 
bigger than non Java. In addition, Java has adequate infrastructures and 
human resources to support such activities. 
Table III.4 
Average District Own Revenue before and after Decentralization 
(Rp million) 
Region Growth Growth
(%) (%)
Java 11,452 14,048 22.7 12,750 24,001 50,138 108.9 37,069 190.7
Non Java 5,791 5,830 0.7 5,810 12,797 17,499 36.7 15,148 160.7
Java + Non Java 7,691 8,285 7.7 7,988 16,088 27,077 68.3 21,583 170.2
Average 
Growth (%)
Before  Decentralization After Desentralization
98/99 99/00 Average 2001 2002 Average
Source: Bapekki, Ministry of Finance 
Before decentralization, the local tax growth was 31.4 percent while 
user-charge growth was -11,6 persen. In the decentralization era, the growth 
changed to 87.8 percent and 24.5 percent, respectively. 
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 Table III.5 
District Own Revenue Components before and after Decentralization 
(Rp million) 
Growth Growth
(%)  (%)
Java
Local Tax 4,083 5,777 41.5 9,204 26,463 187.5
User-Charges 5,347 6,372 19.2 10,270 12,752 24.2
Profit from Local Owned      
Enterprises 319 390
22.2 519 1,154 122.4
Others 1,703 1,509 -11.4 4,008 9,769 143.7
Non Java
Local Tax 2,802 3,594 28.2 6,395 8,199 28.2
User-Charges 2,232 1,419 -36.4 3,093 3,871 25.1
Profit from Local Owned      
Enterprises 119 160
34.2 260 487 87.5
Others 637 657 3.1 3,049 4,941 62.1
Java + Non Jawa
Local Tax 3,232 4,246 31.4 7,221 13,559 87.8
User-Charges 3,278 2,899 -11.6 5,202 6,477 24.5
Profit from Local Owned      
Enterprises 186 229
22.8 336 683 103.3
Others 995 912 -8.4 3,330 6,358 90.9
Region
Before  Decentralization After Decentralization
98/99 99/00 2001 2002
Source: Bapekki, Ministry of Finance 
 
Local tax and user-charge are the main sources in the regional own 
revenue in Indonesia. Sub-national taxation is regulated by Law 34 of 2000 on 
regional taxes.  There are four provincial taxes, 1) motor vehicle tax, 2) motor 
vehicle transfer tax, 3) fuel excise tax, and 4) ground water extraction and use 
tax. For local government, there are seven kinds of taxes, 1) hotel tax, 2) 
restaurant tax, 3) street lighting tax, 4) advertisement tax, 5) entertainment tax, 
6) mining tax for class c minerals and 7) parking tax. The tax bases and caps 
are determined by the national government. In relation with these, the sub-
national government can set their rates up to the determined caps.  
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 Table III.6 
Type of Tax Level Tax Base Cap
Motor Vehicle Tax Provincial Based on Vehicle Value (annual) 5%
Motor Vehicle Transfer Tax Provincial Based on Vehicle Re-Sale Price (annual) 10%
Fuel Excise Tax Provincial Based on Fuel Consumption (Retail Price excl. VAT) 5%
Water Excise Tax Provincial Based on Water Consumption 20%
Hotel Tax Local Based on Turn Over 10%
Restaurant Tax Local Based on Turn Over 10%
Entertainment Tax Local Based on Turn Over (Admission Price) 35%
Adsvertisement Tax Local Based on Advertisement Rent 25%
Street Lighting Local Based on Electricity Consumption (Retail Price excl. VAT) 10%
Mining of C-Class Minerals Local Based on Market Value of Extracted Minerals 20%
Parking Tax Local Based on Parking Fees 20%
Source: Law 34 of 2000, (Worldbank 2003), PWC (2005)
Sub-National Taxes
 
 
Furthermore, Art 2 of Law 34 of 2000 states that local governments 
have the right to impose new local taxes as long as these taxes comply with 
eight general “good tax” principles: 
− They are taxes, not levies.  
− Tax base is located in the region and immobile. 
− Taxes do not conflict with public interest. 
− Tax base is not taxed by provincial and national taxation. 
− Adequate revenue potential. 
− Taxes do not exert economic distortions. 
− Equity concerns are taken into account. 
− Environmental sustainability is taken in account. 
Law 33 of 2004 also prohibits local governments from establishing own 
revenue sources that impose high costs on the economy or restrict the 
mobility of people and goods and services across (internal) borders or 
constrain (international) imports and exports. This provision was introduced 
in reaction to imposition of taxes on interjurisdictional trade by some local 
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 governments. The right to impose new taxes and user charges is a new sub-
national authority introduced by Law 34 of 2000 and was accompanied by 
fears of mushrooming local taxes. In order to prevent the issuing of a plethora 
of sub-national charges and taxes, review and retrospective approval by the 
central government is required. The oversight function resides with an inter-
ministerial review team of the Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of 
Finance. To deal with such problem, the government is currently preparing a 
revision of Law 34 of 2000, which apparently includes a positive list of local 
taxes and user charges in order to reduce the administrative burden of the 
review process and prevent inefficient taxation practices. The following table 
shows how Indonesian local revenue is administered. 
Table III.7 
Indonesian Local Revenue Administration 
 
 
? Revenues are administered according to a multilevel model: 
− The central government administers national taxes. 
− Local tax agencies, generally known as DIPENDAs, play a minor role 
in administering the property tax. 
− Vehicle and vehicle transfer taxes are jointly administered by the 
provincial DIPENDA, the national police (as the coordinator), and a 
state-owned insurance firm. 
? Regional own revenues are administered directly by DIPENDA’s of the 
cities, regencies, and provinces except for street lighting and fuel taxes. 
However, by issuing permits and licenses, local departments actually 
collect the user charges coordinated by the DIPENDAs. 
? The administrative performance of the DIPENDAs varies widely. 
? DIPENDAs have few cooperative agreements or information exchanges 
with other agencies within the same government, except for property tax 
field offices of the Directorate General of Taxation. 
? DIPENDAs may use a certain percentage of total tax revenues to pay 
allowances to staff, despite the fact that these bonuses are not usually 
based on performance. 
? The quality of tax administration varies. Most DIPENDAs receive takes 
directly in their offices, while others use partially government-owned 
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 regional development banks. 
? One of the highest priorities of most DIPENDAs is developing the ability 
to professionally audit taxpayers, considered the weakest link in the 
system. The approach to taxpayer auditing varies by local government. 
DIPENDAs tried to introduce information technology in the early 1990s, 
but few local governments are still operating the computer systems 
because of lack of training.     
 
Source: World Bank, 2005 
 
 
 
III.3.1 Recent Performance of District-Level Own Revenue  
To understand the recent regional own revenue performance for the district-
level governments, a research was conducted. Considering the data 
availability and consistency, this research used 214 out of 440 local 
governments’ data in FY 2004. This amount is relatively adequate to represent 
all districts in Indonesia since it covered all provinces in Indonesia.  
The focus of the research is to portrait the performance of local own 
revenue collection for FY 2004, the fourth implementation year of 
decentralization. This research is important because in the future, ideally, the 
local governments should not very much rely on the intergovernmental 
transfers to support the spending as happened up to the recent. The local 
governments should seek the way to optimize the revenues from own-sources. 
This effort should be done because the intergovernmental transfers are more 
fluctuated than the local own revenues (Bappenas 2003). The 
intergovernmental transfers could be difference from time to time due to the 
existing policy or the other factors. Therefore, it is quite important to increase 
the role of the local own revenue on the local spending to guarantee the fiscal 
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 sustainability for the localities. Similar research for provincial–level 
governments has been conducted by National Development Planning Agency 
(Bappenas) in 2003. At that time, it was found that in FY 2002 most of the 
provinces had poor performance in generating the regional own revenues.  
 In 2004, the average own revenue growth was 25.24 percent. It means 
that the local government could increase the own revenue growth to slightly 
more than a quarter on average from the previous fiscal year (2003). 
Unfortunately, from 214 local governments, 50 local governments had 
negative growth (See Appendix A.1). Another interesting finding is that non-
Java local governments could lead the own revenues growth. This means that 
they performed well-efforts to identify their own revenues then executed 
well-organize management to capture the sources. The following table shows 
the fact. 
Table III.8 
More than 100% Growth in District Own Revenue 
 
No. Regency/Municipal Province Own Revenue Growth (%)*
1 Kab. Aceh Tamiang NAD 437.70
2 Kab. Penajam Paser Utara Kaltim 367.55
3 Kab. Aceh Barat Daya NAD 334.00
4 Kab. Paniai Papua 310.12
5 Kab. Fak-Fak Papua 261.39
6 Kab. Lombok Tengah NTB 221.99
7 Kota Ambon Maluku 167.73
8 Kab. Banyuasin Sumsel 136.72
9 Kota Tanjung Pinang Riau 129.56
10 Kab. Nagan Raya NAD 128.15
11 Kab. Rokan Hulu Riau 121.66
12 Kota Tebing Tinggi Sumut 118.24
13 Kab. Bekasi Jabar 117.48
14 Kab. Banggai Sulteng 105.14
*the growth of own-source revenue year i from year i-1  
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 The table depicts that of the leading in-growth local governments (i.e. 
those could reach more than 100% growth), there was only one local 
government in Java, i.e. Kabupaten Bekasi (Province West Java), could reach 
such level. The rest are non-Java local governments. However, it should be 
noted that the high growth of own revenue does not always mean the high 
share to the local spending. It is found that in 2004, the leading - in growth 
governments were different from the leading - in share governments. 
Table III.9 
The Big 14 in Share on Total Spending 
 
No. Regency/Municipal Province
Share to 
Spending 
2004*
1 Kab. Badung Bali 60.44
2 Kota Cilegon Banten 35.52
3 Kab. Bekasi Jabar 33.96
4 Kota Denpasar Bali 26.06
5 Kota Medan Sumut 25.68
6 Kota Semarang Jateng 23.56
7 Kota Yogyakarta Yogya 21.58
8 Kota Bandung Jabar 21.02
9 Kota Tangerang Banten 19.60
10 Kab. Sidoarjo Jatim 19.45
11 Kota Kupang NTT 18.49
12 Kab. Bogor Jabar 17.20
13 Kab. Tangerang Banten 17.16
14 Kab. Fak-Fak Papua 16.97
*the ratio between the own-source revenue and the total spending  
 
 On average, the own revenue supported about 8.17 percent of the total 
spending. Kabupaten Badung, located in Province Bali, accounted more than 
60 percent. On the other hand, Kabupaten Penajam Paser Utara accounted 
only about 1 percent (See Appendix A.2). It means that this regency depended 
very much on the other revenue sources other than its local own revenue to 
support the total spending.  
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  In order to get the local financial ability status more precisely, the 
Quadrant and Index method will be used. In doing so, some measures will be 
determined first. Elasticity (E), share (S), and growth (G) are chosen to 
represent the local financial ability (Bappenas 2003). Elasticity is the ratio 
between the own revenue growth and the gross domestic regional product 
(GDRP) growth. Share is the ratio between the own revenue and total 
spending. Finally, growth is the growth of own revenue year i from year i-1.   
 
III.3.1.1 Quadrant Method 
This method will show the financial ability map. The map will be divided into 
4 quadrants. Each quadrant will explain better the financial condition of each 
local government in terms of share (S) and growth (G). To obtain the map, 
first of all, the share (S) and the growth (G) for each local government are 
calculated using the following formulas.  
%100×=
gtotspendin
PADS … 1) 
%1001 ×−= −
i
ii
PAD
PADPADG …2) 
Where: 
S = share of local own revenue on total spending (in percent) 
PAD = local own revenue 
totspending= total spending for the respective fiscal year 
G = local own revenue growth (in percent) 
iPAD  = PAD year i 
 33
  34
1−iPAD
 
 
 
  
After obtaining the share and growth for each local government, an 
average share and growth were determined. Based on this average point, the 
quadrant for each local government could be determined.  From the 214 local 
governments observed, it is found that almost 50 percent were still in the 
Quadrant IV. Meanwhile, only around 9 percent were in the Quadrant I.  
Slightly over 25 percent were in the Quadrant II. Finally, around 20 percent 
were in the Quadrant III (See the following Figure III.4 for the brief and 
Appendix B for the detailed).  
= PAD year i-1 
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Figure III.4 
The Map of Local Governments Financial Ability-Quadrant Method  
(Average Point: Growth=25.24; Share=8.17)  
 
 The following table gives explanations for each quadrant. 
 
Table III.10 
Quadrant Descriptions 
Quadrant Description 
I This is an ideal condition. Own revenue has a significant 
share in the total spending. In addition, the local 
government also has the ability to improve local potency. 
This condition is showed by the high share and growth. 
II This condition is not ideal yet. The relative high share of 
own revenue has chance to decrease due to the low 
growth of own revenue. Here, the share of own revenue 
to total spending is high, but the own revenue growth is 
low. 
III This condition is also not ideal yet, but the local 
government has ability to improve the local potency so 
that own revenue has chance to have larger share in total 
spending. Here, the share of own revenue is low but the 
growth is high. 
IV This is the worst condition. The own revenue has not had 
significant share in total spending. Also, local 
government has not had ability to improve the local 
potency. Both the share and growth of own revenue are 
low.  
Source: National Development Planning Agency (2003) 
From 214 local governments observed, 8.88% local governments had high 
share and growth, 25.70% high share but low growth,  19.63% low share but 
high growth, and 45.79% low share and growth (See Figure III.5). 
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 Figure III.5 
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 Of 19 local governments in the Quadrant I, there were 7 local 
governments come from the Eastern Part of Indonesia (See Appendix B). It 
indicates that the fiscal decentralization had stimulated those regions to 
increase their ability to support their own-spending. It is well-known that 
years before the enactment of the fiscal decentralization, most of the eastern 
part of Indonesia showed poor performance in generating their own revenue 
due to the highly centralization policy. In addition, Table III.11 informs that 
the Java local governments’ domination had been decreased. It is indeed a 
good signal of equalization as one of the basic fiscal decentralization purposes.  
However, most of the local governments were still in the Quadrant IV. Both 
the share and the growth of own revenue were still low.  The local 
governments in the Eastern part of Indonesia accounted almost 46 percent 
while the Western part accounted almost 54 percent (See Appendix B).    
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 Table III.11 
List of Districts in Quadrant I 
No. Regency/Municipal Share Criterion
Growth 
Criterion
1 Kab. Badung HIGH HIGH
2 Kab. Bekasi HIGH HIGH
3 Kab. Fak-Fak HIGH HIGH
4 Kab. Lombok Tengah HIGH HIGH
5 Kab. Lombok Timur HIGH HIGH
6 Kab. Pasuruan HIGH HIGH
7 Kab. Pati HIGH HIGH
8 Kab. Rokan Hulu HIGH HIGH
9 Kab. Tabanan HIGH HIGH
10 Kab. Tangerang HIGH HIGH
11 Kota Ambon HIGH HIGH
12 Kota Banjarmasin HIGH HIGH
13 Kota Blitar HIGH HIGH
14 Kota Depok HIGH HIGH
15 Kota Gorontalo HIGH HIGH
16 Kota Jambi HIGH HIGH
17 Kota Kupang HIGH HIGH
18 Kota Pangkal Pinang HIGH HIGH
19 Kota Tanjung Pinang HIGH HIGH  
   
III.3.1.2 Index Method 
The next method used to determine the financial ability among regions is the 
Index Method. Beside the two measures (share (S) and growth (G)) which 
used in the previous method, elasticity (E) is added in this method. The 
following formula is used to calculate the elasticity. 
i
ii
i
ii
GDRP
GDRPGDRP
PAD
PADPAD
E
1
1
−
−
−
−
= …3) 
Where: 
E = the ratio between PAD growth and GDRP growth 
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 iGDRP  = gross domestic regional product year i 
1−iGDRP = gross domestic regional product year i-1 
After calculating the measures, then each measure is transformed to the index 
number using the following formula. 
minmax
min
XX
XXIndexX −
−=  …..4) 
Finally to have the Index of Financial Ability (IFA), the following formula is 
used. 
3
SEG XXXIFA ++= ….5) 
Where: 
GX = Growth Index 
EX = Elasticity Index  
SX = Share Index  
 
From the elasticity analysis, it is found that almost 120 local 
governments had elasticity E ≥  1 (See Appendix C). It means that any change 
in the GDRP is sensitive over the change (i.e. increasing) in own revenue. 
However, there were 25 local governments that had E ≥  1 with negative sign. 
This means that any change in the RGDP is sensitive over the change (i.e. 
decreasing) in own revenue. Finally, the rest local governments had E p  1 
which means the change in RGDP is not sensitive over the change in own 
revenue (See Appendix C). 
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 Table III.12 
The Big 10 Districts with E  1 ≥
 
No. Regency/Municipal Province Elasticity
1 Kab. Aceh Tamiang NAD 35.64
2 Kab. Aceh Barat Daya NAD 31.67
3 Kab. Fak-Fak Papua 28.75
4 Kab. Penajam Paser Utara Kaltim 23.89
5 Kab. Lombok Tengah NTB 20.92
6 Kota Ambon Maluku 16.73
7 Kab. Paniai Papua 16.48
8 Kab. Bekasi Jabar 14.69
9 Kota Kupang NTT 12.44
10 Kab. Nagan Raya NAD 11.03  
Comparing to the Quadrant Method, the Index Method accommodates 
more measure than the Quadrant Method since it used the elasticity (E) of 
own revenue growth over the gross domestic regional product (GDRP) 
growth together with the previous ones.  The big ten local governments that 
had high IFA in 2004 are as follow. 
Table III.13 
The Big 10 High IFA Districts  
 
No. Regency/Municipal Province IFA
1 Kab. Aceh Tamiang NAD 0.68
2 Kab. Fak-Fak Papua 0.58
3 Kab. Aceh Barat Daya NAD 0.57
4 Kab. Penajam Paser Utara Kaltim 0.53
5 Kab. Badung Bali 0.50
6 Kab. Lombok Tengah NTB 0.47
7 Kab. Bekasi Jabar 0.47
8 Kab. Paniai Papua 0.44
9 Kota Ambon Maluku 0.38
10 Kota Kupang NTT 0.34  
Consistent with the previous method, the Index Method shows that 
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 most of the local governments (68%) still had below-the average IFA. Even 
after considering the elasticity of GDRP growth over the PAD growth, the 
financial ability of most local governments was relatively low.  
Figure III.6 
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III.4 Intergovernmental Transfers 
The system of intergovernmental transfers in Indonesia comprises three basic 
types of transfer schemes. These are revenue sharing, a general allocation 
grant (Dana Alokasi Umum – DAU), and grants for special allocation (Dana 
Alokasi Khusus – DAK).  
The following table describes the main objectives of intergovernmental 
transfers system in Indonesia. 
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 Table III.14 
The Main Objectives of Intergovernmental Transfers 
Instruments
1 Address vertical fiscal imbalances between government levels shared revenue, DAU
2 Equalize regional government fiscal capacities to deliver services DAU
3 Encourage regional expenditure on national development priorities DAK
4 Promote the attainment of minimum infrastructure standars DAK
5 Compensate for benefit/cost spillovers in priority areas DAK
6 Stimulate regional commitment DAK
7 Stimulate revenue mobilization 
shared 
revenue, DAU, 
DAK
Intergovernmental Transfers' Objectives
Source: Sidik (2003) 
 
Shared revenue, DAU, and DAK can be used to stimulate revenue 
mobilization.  Moreover, DAK is also used to address some local matters. At 
the same time, DAU is used to equalize regional development fiscal capacities. 
Finally, both shared revenue and DAU can be used to address vertical 
imbalances between government levels.  
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 Table III.15 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Intergovernmental Transfers 81.48 94.53 109.93 112.19 124.31
   Revenue Sharing 20.26 24.60 29.93 26.93 31.22
      Tax 8.55 11.95 15.83 16.42 19.50
         Personal Income Tax 3.10 4.07 5.47 6.04 6.40
         Property Tax (PBB) 4.27 5.67 8.52 7.71 9.80
         Property Tittle Transfer Tax (BPHTB) 1.18 2.21 1.85 2.67 3.20
      Natural Resources 11.71 12.66 14.09 10.51 11.80
         Oil 5.90 5.79 6.23 3.84 4.70
         Gas 3.84 4.78 5.67 4.66 4.60
         Mining 0.74 1.07 1.19 1.30 1.60
         Forestry 1.00 0.79 0.57 0.23 0.30
         Fishery 0.23 0.23 0.43 0.48 0.60
   General Purpose Grant (DAU) 60.52 69.11 76.98 82.13 88.77
   Specific Purpose Grant (DAK) 0.70 0.82 3.02 3.13 4.32
Special Autonomy Fund and Adjsutment - 3.77 9.39 6.86 7.24
   Special Autonomy Fund - 1.38 1.54 1.64 1.78
   Adjustment Fund - 2.38 7.85 5.21 5.47
Source: DJAPK, Ministry of Finance
State Budget
Item
SPENDING FOR SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS FY 2001 TO 2005
(Rp trilion) 
 
From FY 2001 to FY 2005, intergovernmental transfers had steadily 
increased.  General Allocation Fund took the highest contribution in the 
transfers. It accounted slightly over 70 percent for the recent fiscal year. On 
the other hand, the shared revenue took the second high in the transfer. It was 
a little over 25 percent in the FY 2005. Lastly, the Special Allocation Fund took 
only less than 5 percent of the transfers.  
 
III.4.1 Revenue Sharing 
Revenue sharing means the transfer of specified shares of the certain national 
revenues to the sub-national budgets. This transfer is intended to respond the 
regional aspirations for increasing access to and controlling over certain 
revenues. As well known, many regions have long felt that they have not 
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benefited sufficiently from the significant revenues generated in their regions. 
For this reason, these sharing schemes constitute an attempt to meet these 
legitimate demands.  
This sharing may also be potentially helpful to stimulate the increase in 
regional revenue mobilization since people may be more likely to pay a 
particular tax if they are assured that they are getting a fair share of such 
revenue. In addition, regions may be more inclined under such conditions. As 
a result, they further enhance resource mobilization.  
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Table III.16 
Central Govt.
Originating 
Provincial 
Government
Originating 
Local 
Governments
All Local Govts. 
in Originating 
Province
All Local 
Govts. (Equal 
Share)
Central Govt.
Originating 
Provincial 
Government
Originating 
Local 
Governments
All Local Govts. 
in Originating 
Province
All Local 
Govts. (Equal 
Share)
1 Oil
Base rate 85 3 6 6 - 84.5 3 6 6 -
Conditional rate 
(Education) 0.1 0.2 0.2
2 Natural Gas
Base rate 70 6 12 12 - 69.5 6 12 12 -
Conditional rate 
(Education) 0.1 0.2 0.2
3 Mining Landrent 20 16 64 - - 20 16 64 - -
4 Mining Royalty 20 16 32 32 - 20 16 32 32 -
5 Fishery Royalty 20 - - 80 - 20 - - 80 -
6 Forestry License 20 16 64 - - 20 16 64 - -
7 Forestry Royalty 20 16 32 32 - 20 16 32 32 -
8 Geothermal Mining - - - - - 20 16 32 32 -
9 Reforestration Fund 60 - 40 - - 60 - 40 - -
10 Property Tax 9 16.2 64.8 - 10 9 16.2 64.8 - 10
11 Property Transfer Tax  16 64 - 20 20 16 64 - -
12 Personal Income Tax - - - - - 80 8 12 - -
Law 25 of 1999 Law 33 of 2004
Arrangements Natural Resource and Tax Revenue Sharing 
No. Revenue Type
Source: Directorate General of Budget and Finance Balancing, Ministry of Finance  
 
 
 The table shows that while most of tax sharing is primarily based on upon 
derivation principle, fishery royalty, and property related taxes also use equal 
shares as an added criterion. The 9 percent national share in the property tax 
is simply “the administrative fee” to compensate the national tax 
administration for the collection and administering of the tax. It is worth 
mentioning that for apportionment of personal income taxes, place of work 
criterion is used rather than the almost universally criterion, i.e. the used 
place of residence.   
 In Indonesia, it is well-known that the arrangements for natural 
resource revenue sharing are not a new feature of Law 25/1999, but they had 
been in place for mining and forestry proceeds in the pre-reform period. 
However, the decentralization increased the relative share of local 
governments. Most of the revenues from these two resources are returned to 
the originating provincial/local jurisdictions.  
The revised Law 33 of 2004 introduces some slight changes to current 
sharing arrangements. It introduces a new type of shared revenue, namely 
proceeds from geothermal mining. The new law also slightly increases the 
sub-national share of oil and natural gas revenues. Starting FY 2009, 84.5% of 
oil revenues will accrue to the central budget and 15.5% to sub-national 
governments. For gas revenues, 69.5% will go to the central and 30.5% to the 
regions. Sub-national governments will receive an extra 0.5% of both oil and 
gas revenues which are earmarked to increase local expenditures on primary 
education.  
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 In dealing with the oil and gas sharing, it is worth to know that there are at 
least two important objectives related to the sharing. The first objective is to 
redress grievances of the resource rich provinces that while they face the 
development costs and environmental consequences of resource exploitation, 
all benefits from such exploitation accrue only to the central government. 
Current revenue sharing arrangements for oil and gas attempt to strike an 
insubstantial balance among the genuine grievances of resource rich 
provinces and national equity objectives. The later objective calls for resource 
revenue to accrue to the national government for use in an equalization 
program. 
Beside the sharing arrangements for national revenues, local 
governments also receive shares from the four provincial taxes, namely the 
motor vehicle tax (30%), vehicle transfer tax (30%), fuel excise tax (70%) and 
ground water extraction and use tax (70%). Nonetheless, the contributions of 
these taxes to overall local revenues are relatively small (World Bank 2005).  
 
III.4.2 General Allocation Grant (DAU) 
The general allocation grant, Dana Alokasi Umum (DAU), is the main source 
of revenue for most local governments. At the same time, the DAU grant is 
the principal instrument for both vertical (across levels of government) and 
horizontal equalization (across sub-national governments). The allocation of 
the DAU grant follows a formula based approach aimed at aligning fiscal 
capacity to fiscal needs of local governments.   
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Source: DJAPK, Ministry of Finance 
 
As shown by Figure III.6, it can be seen that the contribution of the 
general allocation fund in the district – level revenues from FY 2001 to FY 
2005 were quite significant. For the FY 2005, the general allocation fund 
accounted more than 80 percent in overall district-level governments’ 
revenues. It indicates the significant reliance of district-level governments on 
the central government in terms of the funding resources. The district-level 
governments’ reliance on the general allocation fund is quite different 
comparing with the provincial-level. The provincial-level governments do not 
depend as much as the districts. They accounted less than 30 percent in FY 
2005. From this fact, it can be concluded that the provinces are more 
independent in this context than the districts.   
Under Law 25 of 1999 the general allocation fund formula was based 
on two components: (1) a minimum allocation (allocation that local 
governments receive regardless of their fiscal gap), consisting of a lump sum 
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 equal across all local governments and a compensation of civil service wage 
bills; (2) a fiscal gap component estimating the difference between own fiscal 
capacity and fiscal needs. To smoothen the transition from the pre-reform 
system, the results of the formula based allocation were adjusted to comply 
with the so called hold harmless provision that ensured that under the actual 
allocation no local government would receive less than in pre-reform period 
taking into account SDO and INPRES2 grants of FY 2000 for the FY 2001 
calculation and previous DAU allocations for subsequent years.   
There exist some revisions on the DAU formula in the Law 33 of 2004. 
First, the revised law gave the new list of variables to be considered in the 
fiscal needs of DAU formula. The poverty variable in the previous law is 
replaced by two new variables, the Gross Domestic Regional Product (GDRP) 
per capita and Human Development Index (HDI). The fiscal needs variable 
now contains of population, area, construction price index, GDRP per capita, 
and HDI. The fiscal capacity variable remains the same, consisting of revenue 
sharing and local own revenue. Another major revision on the DAU formula 
is the clear statement that the DAU allocation formula has to be based on 
fiscal gap concept that is fiscal needs minus fiscal capacity. In addition to 
formula based calculation, the DAU has another component namely the basic 
allocation that is equivalent to local government employee salary.  
Under the new DAU formula which will be applied in FY 2006 for the 
first time, the DAU allocation for an individual district (and equally for a 
province for which the structure of the formula is practically identical), 
                                                          
2 Both SDO and INPRES grants are the former general allocation funds. 
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 denoted  consists of two components, a base allocation compensating 
for civil service wage costs, denoted as  and an equalizing amount to 
address the fiscal gap by taking into consideration fiscal capacity and 
expenditure needs denoted as  (Eckardt and Shah 2006). 
iDAU
iWage
iEqual
(1) = +  iDAU iWage iEqual
Law 33 of 2004 requires that DAU compensates for the total of civil service 
wages, implying that equals the actual wage costs of a given district. 
Following from that the total DAU pool is reduced by the aggregate sub-
national wage costs effectively reducing the amount available for the 
equalizing component. The equal per municipality lump sum component that 
existed under Law 25 of 1999 is abolished by the new rules and the basic 
allocation is supposed to be entirely based on the regional civil service wage 
bill. 
iWage
The amount regions received under the equalizing component depend 
on the fiscal gap of a given district ( ) which is defined as the 
disparity between fiscal needs and fiscal capacity: 
iFiscalGap
(2) = -   iFiscalGap icityFiscalCapa iFiscalNeed
icityFiscalCapa  is defined as the sum of potential own revenues ( ), the 
revenues from shared taxes ( ) and shared natural resource 
revenues ( ) in a given district.   
iPAD
isSharedTaxe
iSDA
(3) = + + x  icityFiscalCapa iPAD isSharedTaxe SDAWeight iSDA
There are two important aspects of the part of the formula. First, note that 
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 own revenue component ( ) does not refer to actual but potential own 
revenues which are estimated as a linear function of the average local tax 
effort and the local GDP. The average local tax in turn is estimated on the 
basis of a regression of real own revenue against local GDP per district from 
the previous fiscal year. This trait of the formula was introduced to make 
fiscal capacity neutral to own tax effort. Second, as can be seen from the 
formula, only revenues from shared natural resource royalties are discounted 
in the calculation of fiscal capacity in recognition of the fact that resource 
extraction places additional costs on resource rich jurisdictions in terms for 
infrastructure and services and environmental degradation. 
iPAD
The fiscal need for each district ( ) is estimated as a function 
of five expenditure need indicators: population size, area, Human 
Development Index, regional per capita GDP and regional price differentials 
reflecting the assumption that these five factors drive expenditure needs. 
Under the given framework, districts with larger than average population, 
higher than average poverty, larger than average area or higher than average 
prices are assumed to have higher expenditure needs. Specifically the 
indicators are: (1) the proportional population size of the district 
( )divided by the average population size of all districts ( ); (2) the 
relative area calculated as the district area ( ) divided by the national 
average area ( ); (3) the relative Human Development Index 
estimated as Human Development Index ( ) divided by the national 
average Human Development Index ( ); (4) the relative per capita 
iFiscalNeed
iPop MEANPop
iArea
MEANArea
iHDI
MEANHDI
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 GDP estimated as district per capita GDP ( ) divided by national 
average per capita GDP ( )and (5) an indicator  to account for price 
differential in providing similar services across districts calculated as the 
construction index for each district ( ) divided by the average 
construction price index ( ). This way of estimating fiscal needs 
assumes that more populous, larger, less developed regions have higher 
expenditure needs. In formal terms the fiscal need amount can be expressed 
as follows: 
iPCGDP
MEANPCGDP
iicePr
MEANicePr
(4)
N
APBD
x
ice
ice
PCGDP
PCGDP
HDI
HDI
Area
Area
Pop
Pop
FiscalNeed
PREVIOUS
TOTAL
MEAN
i
MEAN
i
MEAN
i
MEAN
i
MEAN
i
i ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ++++=
Pr
Prεδγβα   
Where εδγβα ,,,, denote the weight assigned to each factor and the 
summation of the weights must be 1 ( 1=++++ εδγβα ). The specific 
weights assigned to the individual indicators. To receive the actual amount of 
estimated expenditure needs the combined need index is multiplied with the 
average expenditure need, which is calculated as the average local 
government spending in the previous fiscal year.  
The calculation of the equalizing component of the formula varies for 
districts depending on whether they have a fiscal gap or excess capacity, as 
defined in equation (2). For districts with excess capacity or fiscal surplus the 
equalizing amount is equal to the negative of their fiscal surplus: 
(5)   if   ii FiscalGapEqual −= 0≥iFiscalGap
For those regions the amount will be directly substracted from the 
wage based allocation ( ) in equation (1). This reduces not only the iWage
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 individual allocation but by definition the aggregate of the wage based 
allocation. The excess resources resulting from this step will be added to the 
pool available for the equalizing component for districts that face fiscal gaps. 
Unlike the previous DAU formula, there is no minimum allocation that local 
governments receive regardless of the fiscal capacity.  
For districts with negative fiscal gaps, where fiscal needs surpass fiscal 
capacity in equation (2) the DAU pool available for equalizing component is 
distributed as a function of their proportional fiscal gap. To arrive at the 
actual allocation the total pool defined as the sum of residual of the total DAU 
pool ( ) after substracting total wage costs and the sum of excess 
capacities from district with positive fiscal gaps (
sidualDAU Re
ialCapacityExcessFisc∑ ) is 
multiplied with the proportional fiscal gap. The proportional fiscal gap is 
calculated as the of a given district divided by the mean fiscal gap 
of all districts where expenditure needs exceed fiscal capacity ( ) 
iFiscalGap
MEANFiscalGap
(6) 
N
alCapacityExcessFiscDAU
x
FiscalGap
FiscalGap
Equal isidual
MEAN
i
i
)( Re ∑+=   
if < 0 iFiscalGap
Note however, that due to the hold harmless condition which will be 
applied to the formula based allocations until FY 2006 the distribution is 
changed in significant ways. In order to arrive at the hold harmless allocation, 
the original formula based allocation for each unit of sub-national 
government is compared to the allocation of the previous fiscal year. The 
surplus for regions that were net beneficiaries of the formula approach is 
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deducted. The accumulated surplus is then re-distributed to those regions 
that would have received less according to the formula approach. Law 33 of 
2004 requires that hold harmless condition will be phased out starting in FY 
2007.  
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Item DAU FY 2001 DAU FY 2002 DAU FY 2003 DAU FY 2004
DAU Components BF + FG MA + FG MA + FG MA + FG
BF/MA DRD + DPD TA 2000 Lumpsum + α Salary Lumpsum + α Salary Lumpsum + α Salary
Coefficient of variation; Williamson Index 0.49;0.63 0.45;0.62 0.44;0.61 0.48;0.63
Composition of BF/MA and FG 20% FG Province Province Province
80% BF •20% Lumpsum •10% Lumpsum •5% Lumpsum
•30% α Salary •30% α Salary •30% α Salary
•50% FG •60% FG •65% FG
•75% NRRS •75% NSSR •100% NRRS
•100% Estimated OSR •50% Estimated OSR •50% Estimated OSR
District District District
•10% Lumpsum •5% Lumpsum •5% Lumpsum
•50% α Salary •45% α Salary •40% α Salary
•40% FG •50% FG •55% FG
•75% NRRS •75% NRRS •100% NRRS
•100% Estimated OSR •50% Estimated OSR •50% Estimated OSR
Where: (BF=Balancing Factor, MA=Minimum Allocation, FG=Fiscal Gap, NRRS=Natural Resource Revenue Sharing, OSR=Own-Source Revenue)
The Calculation of General Allocation Grant (DAU) for FY 2001 to 2004
 
Source: DJAPK, Ministry of Finance 
Table III.17 
 
 The DAU calculation from FY 2001 to FY 2004 (under Law 25 0f 1999) is 
shown by Table III.17.  The DAU components consisted of balancing factor 
(since FY 2002 called minimum allocation) and fiscal gap. The fiscal gap was 
determined by DAU formula. It is important to note that the role of formula 
in determining the fiscal gap increased year to year. In the first year of 
decentralization, the role of formula accounted only about 20% of total DAU.  
Later years, both for province and district level governments the role of 
formula increased. It is also important to highlight the equalization indicators 
for the above period. There are two indicators mentioned: the coefficient of 
variation and the Williamson Index. The smaller indicators mean the more 
equalized allocation (Hamid 2005). From FY 2001 to FY 2003, both indicators 
decreased which mean the more equalized allocation existed. However, there 
happened slight increase of both indicators in FY 2004.     
  
III.4.3 Special Allocation Grant (DAK) 
In addition to the formula driven block grant (DAU), Law 25 of 1999 and 
subsequently Law 33 of 2004 authorize earmarked grants, so called special 
allocation grants (DAK). The central government can use DAK to finance 
special needs, including emergencies, and to promote special national 
priorities in the regions. The DAK funding is supposed to be prioritized to 
finance special needs of local governments with lower than average fiscal 
capacity.  
Government Regulation No. 104 of 2000 defines the criteria for DAK. 
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 These funds can be used to fund activities that are related to national 
priorities or that cannot be included in the calculation of DAU because they 
are specific needs of particular regions, for example, emergency relief, or 
specific investments needs in remote localities. DAK funds are usually 
earmarked to finance capital expenditures administrative costs, project 
allowances, research, training, and the like cannot be financed by DAU. 
Moreover, DAK are designed as matching grants to ensure they truly meet 
local demand by shifting marginal costs to local budgets.  
Formally, local governments need to match at least 10 percent of the 
total cost trough own resources. They also need to prove that DAK projects 
cannot be financed through their own budgets. In FY 2001 and 2002 the use of 
DAK is limited to a reforestation fund. Starting 2003, the central government 
has extended DAK grants to finance the maintenance of health and education 
facilities, infrastructure, including road, irrigation and water facilities, 
government property, and to finance projects in the fishery sector. The 
following table informs the detailed allocation of DAK for the period 
beginning FY 2003 to FY 2006. It should be noted that there happened 
significant DAK increase in FY 2006 (comparing to the previous year, there 
increased by almost three times).   
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 Table III.18 
2003 2004 2005 2006
1 Infrastructure 1,181,000.00 1,196,250.00 1,533,000.00 3,811,380.00
a. Road 842,500.00 357,200.00 945,000.00 2,575,705.00
b. Irrigation 338,500.00 839,050.00 384,500.00 627,675.00
c. Water Supply 203,500.00 608,000.00
2 Health 375,000.00 456,180.00 620,000.00 2,406,795.00
3 Education 625,000.00 652,600.00 1,221,000.00 2,919,525.00
4 Government Infrastructure 88,000.00 228,000.00 148,000.00 448,675.00
5 Fishery 305,470.00 322,000.00 775,675.00
6 Farming 170,000.00 1,094,875.00
7 Environment 112,875.00
2,269,000.00 2,838,500.00 4,014,000.00 11,569,800.00
No. Sector Allocation
Specific Purpose Grant (DAK) Allocation FY 2003 to 2006 (Rp million)
Source: Directorate General of Budget and Finance, Ministry of Finance 
 
The allocation of the various DAK grants is based on three sets of 
criteria, general criteria, special criteria, and technical criteria. The first two 
sets of criteria are set uniformly for all sectors by Ministry of Finance.  
The general criteria is an index capturing the net fiscal position of a 
given district ( ), which is calculated by subtracting civil service wages 
( ) from total revenues (sum of Own Revenue, DAU, DAK and shared 
revenues, and taxes excluding surpluses), denoted as  divided by 
national average of the same measure (Eckardt and Shah 2006). 
iFNI
iWages
ivRe
(7) N
Wagev
Wagev
FNI
ii
ii
i ×−∑
−=
Re
Re        
Districts which score higher than one on this measure are eligible for DAK 
grants. This measure is sensitive to how much resources a region has to its 
disposal to finance capital expenditures. 
The special criteria directly refer to a number of provinces, including 
Papua, Aceh, and province in East Indonesia that are eligible for DAK grants. 
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 In addition, coastal areas, conflict regions, less developed, and regions that 
experience floods and other natural disasters are supposed to receive DAK 
grants.  The regulations remain unclear about how and to what extent these 
criteria are included in allocation process.  
The technical criteria are set by the respective sectoral departments in 
consultation with Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Home Affairs. As a 
consequence, this criteria differs across sectors. In the education sector for 
example the number of class rooms in bad condition and the construction 
price index are used. Meanwhile, the technical criteria in health sector states 
the Human Poverty Development Index (HPI), the number of health service 
facilities, and the construction price index. 
 
III.5 Local Government Borrowing 
In Indonesia, concerns about macro-economic instability have led the 
government to carefully regulate access of regional governments to capital 
markets. Both Law 25 of 1999 and Law 33 of 2004 allow for regional 
borrowing from both domestic and international sources and to issue 
denominated municipal bonds on domestic capital markets. In addition, 
regional governments may also guarantee third party debt. However, at the 
same time the related government regulation on regional borrowing sets tight 
limits for debt-revenue ratios. The total debt is limited to 75 percent of 
revenues minus necessary expenditures3. On the other hand, service is limited 
                                                          
3 This condition is now directly included in Law 33 of 2004. 
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 to 35 percent of revenues minus necessary expenditures. Moreover, the short 
term borrowing (less than one year maturity) is limited to 1/6 of current 
spending and can only be used for cash flow management. Long term 
borrowing (more than one year maturity) can only be used for capital 
expenditures in projects with cost recovery potential. Any long and medium 
term borrowing of local governments requires approval by both the local 
representative council (DPRD) and by the central government (via Ministry of 
Finance). The regulation also gives the central government the right to 
intercept the transfer of DAU grants in the event sub-national governments 
fail to serve their service obligations (Government Regulation 107 of 2000).  
Local governments do not have direct access to capital from 
international resources but can borrow from foreign sources through on-
lending through the Ministry of Finance. Law 33 of 2004 does explicitly state 
that there is no sovereign guarantee for regional bonds, but the law remains 
unclear on defaulted regional government loans. In practice, a ministerial 
decree of the Ministry of Finance has suspended the implementation of these 
rules and has effectively eliminated local borrowing until 2004.     
  As a matter of fact, regional government debt in Indonesia has been 
insignificant comparing to the international standards. The cumulative sub-
national debt to GDP ratio for the years 1978 – 2004, reported by Lewis (2005) 
is 0.33% of GDP, significantly lower than for example in the Mexico (4.9% of 
GDP), South Africa (4.0% of GDP), or Brazil (18.8% of GDP) (Lewis 2003). 
Borrowing has not recovered after a sharp drop during the financial crisis in 
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 1998. At the aggregate local borrowing accounts for a mere 0.2% of the total 
sub-national revenues in FY 2001-2003. This is mainly a consequence of the 
uncertain legal environment that potentially undermined both demand and 
supply for municipal credit. In the same vein, the market for local 
government bonds remains underdeveloped (Eckardt and Shah 2006). 
 Since 1991 six local government development banks that are jointly 
owned by provincial and local governments have issued municipal bonds 
(with medium to long term maturities ranging from 3-7 years) to finance local 
infrastructure projects. Most of the local government debt is indirect debt of 
sub-national public enterprises, mainly regional water suppliers, accounting 
for more than three quarters of the outstanding debt. It is also known that 
repayment performance is poor with only about half of payments due being 
settled. Lewis (2003) has shown that repayment problems are largely a 
function of regional unwillingness, rather than inability to repay debts. 4  In 
addition to the outlined legal complications, the limited creditworthiness 
hampers the expansion of credit access of sub-national governments. In effect, 
the low level of sub-national borrowing potentially constrains infrastructure 
development, efficient public service delivery and economic growth. If 
managed properly, raising capital through loans and the issuance of 
municipal bonds could enhance infrastructure development, in particular in 
better off regions without exerting more pressure on the already stressed 
national budget.
                                                          
4 Estimating a typical debt service ratio 9.5%, Lewis concludes that local governments have 
borrowed well within their fiscal capacities to repay (Lewis, 2003).  
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 CHAPTER IV 
MANAGING BETTER FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION 
 
 
More than five years have passed since major local government reforms were 
first implemented in the beginning of FY 2001. Regional autonomy has 
transformed Indonesia, as one of the most centralized countries in the world, 
into one of the more decentralized ones. Although it is too early to overtake 
conclusive judgment on the effects of these reforms, some early results require 
some comments.  
The transition to a significantly more decentralized mode of 
governance was smooth. As well-known, the transition from centralized to 
more decentralized system needed many action-plans. Fortunately, many of 
the important ones could be realized well. Local governments assumed 
responsibility for their new functions as scheduled. More than 2.5 million civil 
servants were successfully reassigned to the jurisdiction of sub-national 
governments. The central government also has continuously increased the 
pool of resources, both in relative and absolute terms, transferred to sub-
national governments. In 2004, the second round of democratic elections, at 
both national and sub-national levels took place without any major 
interruptions. Moreover, local governments are headed by democratically 
elected mayors nowadays. At the same time, the most significant risks 
associated with decentralization were minimized. The transition also did not 
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 result in a breakdown of service delivery chains, neither triggered macro-
economic instability. Nevertheless, there is always a room for improvement in 
a number of areas that can further enhance the positive effects of 
decentralization in the Indonesian context.  
 
IV.1 Strengthening Local Taxing Power 
Although both provincial and local governments have more variety on 
collecting taxes, it is quite clear that more significant taxes such as income tax, 
value added tax, land and property tax are all under control of the central 
government. In general, the local taxing power in Indonesia considered weak 
due to the absence of one of those major taxes at the local level, even through 
the piggy-backed system. The current fiscal decentralization system, through 
the revised Law 25 of 1999 (i.e. Law 33 of 2004), still emphasizes on the tax 
revenue sharing of property tax, land transfer tax, and personal income tax. 
While the local governments receive certain part of the respective tax 
revenue, they do not have authority in setting tax rate and tax base. As a 
result, the local governments have little room to provide incentive for local 
investors. Moreover, the total of the local own revenue is relatively 
insignificant to the central tax revenue.  In 2003, for example, the total own 
revenue was only around 6% of the net domestic revenue (tax revenue plus 
other revenue) in central budget (APBN). The percentage was even lower 
than 2002 figure. That implied that the local taxing power was not getting 
stronger and the trend might continue for another three years after the 
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 revision of Law 25 of 1999.  
Table IV.1 
 
Indicator 2001 2002 2003
Local Own Revenue / Net Domestic Revenue 5.04% 7.04% 6.08%
Local Own Revenue / GDP 1.00% 1.30% 1.05%
Local Revenue / Net Domestic Revenue 36.38% 44.69% 35.63%
Local Revenue / GDP 7.20% 8.24% 6.17%
Source: Ministry of Finance, Central Statistics Agency
Local Government Revenue in Indonesia, 2001-2003
 
 
Having the fact that most districts are still low both in the share and 
growth of local own revenue (i.e. being classified in the Quadrant IV by the 
Quadrant Method), it is worth to address such issue in a more balanced view.  
Ideally, the decentralization of expenditure responsibilities should gradually 
be accompanied with enhanced taxing power at local levels. However, it is 
very obvious to see that the current approach devolves expenditure authority 
more seriously than tax authority and supports a strong role of the central 
government on the revenue side. While the decentralization of expenditures 
allows for some of the gains from decentralization, such as lower cost of 
production, informational advantages and matching of services with local 
demand, substantial benefits of fiscal decentralization require the devolution 
of the power to tax. The existing reliance on unconditional transfers (general 
allocation grants-DAU) to finance local government operations creates 
incentives that potentially undermine accountability of sub-national 
governments. 5  Therefore, broadening local tax bases has a number of 
potential benefits. If service delivery is more closely linked to local tax 
                                                          
5 See Rodden (2002) for some theoritical considerations and across country analysis. In FY 
2005, it is found that the DAU accounted more than 80% of the districts’ revenue.  
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 payments, citizens face greater incentives to monitor government 
performance, and demand accountability from local governments. At the 
same time, it can further enhance interjurisdictional competition and people 
choosing low tax – low spending jurisdictions over high tax – high spending 
jurisdictions could create powerful incentives to increase spending efficiency. 
If Indonesia wants to benefit from these effects greater, the sub-national 
taxation autonomy is indeed a necessary institutional prerequisite.  
The assignment of some significant tax bases, like property tax or a 
piggy-backed income tax, to finance marginal public good provision has the 
potential to increase efficiency and accountability in local government 
operations. Only by choosing to pay higher or lower taxes at the margin can 
residents of sub-national jurisdictions choose the level of public services they 
want. At the same time, the assignment of more taxation power to lower 
levels would further reduce revenues of poor regions and thus strengthen 
existing disparities in the region’s economic base. Resulting gaps in income 
and fiscal endowments arguably necessitate a strong national role in 
financing national minimum standards of merit goods and equalizations 
payments (Eckardt and Shah 2006). 
Up to the recent, it can be concluded that decentralization in Indonesia 
is more on decentralization in expenditure, financed mostly by 
intergovernmental transfers with limited local taxing power. The local 
governments still heavily rely on the central government transfers to finance 
their expenditure. The current reliance on transfers in their myriad forms 
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 creates dependence on the national government and weaken sub-national 
incentives to improve own revenue. This is, of course, one type of 
decentralization and nothing is wrong with that. Nevertheless, some 
Indonesians believed that the real decentralization should also include the 
decentralization of revenue by giving more local taxing power to local 
governments. Last attempt to strengthen local taxing power by shifting the 
land and property tax from central tax into local tax failed due to strong 
resistance of the land and property tax part in the central taxation office.   
Finally, there are at least four key messages that merit emphasis in this 
context. First, local governments have limited control over tax policy, 
including the ability to set rates and define tax base. Therefore, 
decentralization is more political than fiscal. Lack of control over taxation at 
the margin breaks the tax-accountability link, undermining the expenditure 
efficiency promised by decentralization. While the general limit on own 
revenues is not the only constraint, policy autonomy is essential for 
significant improvement to occur over the medium term. Second, the lack of 
authority over tax policy seems to have spurred local governments to seek 
unofficial tax and non-tax sources of revenue, with deleterious consequences.  
The resort to informal and illegal fees is even more unfortunate considering 
that sub-national governments in the region are unable to avail themselves of 
many taxing options open to government in other regions. Third, despite the 
lack of opportunity to raise revenues and the apparent interest in unofficial 
avenues, sub-national governments do not appear to have exhausted all their 
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 options. Moreover to the extent that the quality of local tax administration 
reflects both capacity and interest, then many sub-national governments 
prefer weak administration. Fourth, improvements in local tax administration 
would greatly strengthen sub-national finance systems. Yet the relative roles 
of local and national governments have not been well designed, resulting in 
both capacity and incentive challenges. Local governments tend to under-
perform on own collection and administration, reducing the credibility of the 
local tax system and contributing to a culture of non-compliance by raising 
compliance costs for tax payers. Local administrative capacity is thus quite 
weak in many cases, and the binding constraint on improving revenue 
performance (World Bank 2005). 
Challenges remain for improving local tax policy and administration. 
The lack of autonomy undermines the ability of local governments to realize 
the benefits of decentralization by tapping significant revenue sources to 
satisfy local preferences regarding the level and quality of services. Fiscal 
sustainability requires improvements in own revenue collection and 
administration more generally. Weak administration undermines local tax 
systems by contributing to high rates of non-compliance, high administrative 
costs for local governments. Getting the relationship between the national and 
local government right – in both policy and administrative terms – is crucial 
(World Bank 2006).          
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 IV.2 Shared Revenue: Providing Trade-Off for Asymmetric 
Decentralization 
Despite the spirit and commitment to make decentralization of Indonesia a 
success, the central government is doing some policies that might not look 
like in the support decentralization itself but actually to protect the unity of 
Indonesia. In 2002, along with the internal problems in the province of Aceh 
and Papua and the trauma of losing the East Timor province, the government 
decided to issue special autonomy laws for both provinces that not only gave 
special local political treatments, but also special intergovernmental transfer 
treatment, especially natural resources revenue sharing.  
Unlike other oil and gas producing regions, those two provinces will 
receive 70% of government revenue share in oil and gas as contrary to others 
that will only receive 15% or 30%. In addition to the special natural resources 
revenue sharing scheme, the Papua province receives their special allocation 
fund with of 2% of total DAU.  That fund has to be allocated for basic public 
services such as education, health and infrastructure.  
Table IV.2 
Aceh Papua
1 Oil 70 70
2 Gas 70 70
3 Landrent 80 80
4 Royalty 80 80
5 Fishery 80 80
6 Forestry Right to Operate Levy (IHPH) 80 80
7 Forestry Resources Commision (PSDH) 80 80
8 Reforestration Fund 40 40
Special Autonomy 
Laws (%)
The Proportion of Revenue Sharing for Aceh & Papua
No. Revenue Type
 
Source: DJAPK, Ministry of Finance 
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 The decision to apply asymmetric decentralization might be 
questionable from economic policy point of view. The political point of view 
might be more dominant here. As expected, the asymmetric decentralization 
generated similar aspiration in other resources rich, but not troubled, regions 
such as Riau and East Kalimantan. Those two provinces were trying to have 
similar treatment but the central government was determined that special 
autonomy laws will only be applied for Aceh and Papua, and not to be 
replicated in other provinces.    
 Complaints from Riau and East Kalimantan might have been 
accommodated through the additional 0.5% oil and gas revenue sharing in 
Law 33 of 2004. Yet, the more crucial problem is still unsolved. This is the 
issue about the transfer disbursement. During the three years period (2001 to 
2003) the resources rich regions always had hard time in managing their cash 
flow since the central government always disbursed the oil and gas revenue 
sharing very late in a fiscal year. The first disbursement might not happen 
until the end of first semester and the following disbursement might continue 
as well toward the end of fiscal year.  
This is certainly difficult for those regions that have major percentage 
of revenue coming from that resources revenue transfer. As a result, they 
ended up with relatively large surplus at the end of fiscal year and implicitly, 
they effectively utilized their excessive funding a year later. Other effects 
were delay of payment to contractors and suppliers working with local 
government or the short term local borrowing to bridge the financing of local 
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 projects or programs. The central government prefers to do this disbursement 
scheme due to uncertainty in both price and volume of oil and gas in the 
revenue side of the budget. However, this cautious move will certainly result 
in the delay of disbursement since the volume prediction and hence, the 
revenue prediction will take some time.  To deal with this problem, a better 
disbursement management must be made by the central, while the local must 
run well budget management to ensure better cash flow management to 
overcome such problem.   
 
IV.3 DAU: Addressing the Inequalities 
Indonesian experience suggests that decentralization does not by itself 
remove inequalities between localities of varying incomes, and quality in 
poorer communities continues to lag. The large horizontal imbalances in fiscal 
resources need to be addressed ensuring that in particular poor local 
governments have adequate resources to fund their newly acquired 
expenditure functions. The currently available fiscal instruments, in particular 
the DAU grant, which is used to pursue partly conflicting purposes (wage 
costs and horizontal equalization), may not be able to satisfy regional equity 
objectives. While compensating vertical fiscal gaps, the DAU is associated 
with positive yet unclear equalization outcomes. The desirable level of 
equality, or conversely the level of acceptable inequality is essentially a 
political question.  
Therefore a fiscal equalization system must utilize an explicit standard 
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 of equalization that is used to determine total pool as well as allocation across 
jurisdictions. The DAU does not embody an explicit standard of equalization, 
its total pool is arbitrarily determined and its formula combines multiple 
factors with arbitrary that work at across purposes. The equity of the final 
impact therefore remains uncertain. Identifying a politically sustainable way 
of reforming the fiscal systems naturally involve tradeoffs. In particular, the 
combination of measures that increase local tax autonomy and strengthen the 
revenue base of fiscally strong regions with a more equalizing DAU system 
might be a politically suitable trade off.            
The DAU distribution formula has the objective of ensuring that 
additional financing of local governments compensates fiscal capacity 
deficiencies without rewarding grantmanship. Recent refinements such as 
elimination of equal per municipality component support this objective by 
eliminating incentives for local governments to split up to receive additional 
assistance. Nevertheless, there are several limitations of this formula. First, 
while expenditure need factors used are defensible, their weights are quite 
arbitrary and indefensible. Combing these fiscal capacity and need factors in a 
formula may lead to inequitable outcomes across jurisdictions and local 
governments with identical fiscal capacity may receive widely varying grants. 
Second, rationale for the inclusion of the wage factor is not clear. It has the 
potential of creating a perverse incentive for padding up civil service payrolls 
resulting in higher local wage bills. While this problem existed under 
previous formula it is exacerbated through the required full compensation of 
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 wage cots under the new formula. Provisions introduced to circumvent this 
such as zero growth policy in civil service and central government clearances 
for new local positions undermine local autonomy in resource allocation. 
Finally and most importantly, the formula lacks an explicit standard of 
equalization and its allocation is not guided by this standard. As a result, 
while DAU allocations are expected to vary positively with fiscal need and 
inversely with fiscal capacity, there would not be any clarity in the degree of 
equalization achieved by this formula.  
As can be seen from Table III.17, the role of the formula from 2001 to 
2004 had steadily increased both for provincial and district level. However, 
the role was not significant yet relatively. There were still many things came 
into consideration in determining the amount of DAU for each government 
level. Beside non-formula factors, the hold-harmless 6  provision must be 
considered too. All these affected the inequalities. Nevertheless, this situation 
can not be avoided due to some reasons. First is the economic reason. It is 
actually not an easy task to have variables that can measure the precise needs 
of each local government. What could be done is only how to develop better 
approach to have such measure. The other one is the political reason. As a 
matter of fact, this reason often became more important than the others in the 
DAU allocation.  
 
 
                                                          
6 The fund receipt in the current fiscal year should be at least the same as or more than last 
year.    
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 IV.3.1 Ideal Future DAU 
The major breakthrough in Law 33 of 2004 regarding the hold-harmless 
provision and DAU allocation is the elimination of hold-harmless provision 
beginning 2008. As well known, that the hold-harmless provision has 
certainly disrupted the DAU performance significantly, especially in 
improving horizontal fiscal imbalance during the first three years of 
decentralization. However, the elimination of hold harmless provision is still 
linked to the existence of basic allocation.   
The local governments that have positive fiscal gap will certainly 
receive DAU higher than its basic allocation. The ones with negative fiscal gap 
will still receive DAU as long as the absolute value of the gap is still less than 
the basic allocation. Most interestingly, if the absolute value of negative fiscal 
gap is higher than the basic allocation, the respective local governments will 
not receive DAU at all. This zero DAU policy is certainly the bravest 
movement the central government has ever made during the fiscal 
decentralization process amid the constant pressures and protest from natural 
resources rich regions that will affected significantly by the policy. However, 
this scheme can only be considered as the second best approach in ensuring 
horizontal fiscal equalization. Some simulations proved that the first best 
approach will be the DAU allocation using pure formula approach without 
the constraint of basic allocation.   
The ideal fiscal decentralization will divide clearly the responsibilities 
of central and local.  With this clarity, theoretically, the expenditures of each 
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 level of government could be calculated based on the Standard of Spending 
Assessment (SSA).  However, the national calculation guidance for this 
standard has not been made yet.  Therefore, this decentralization has not had 
valid calculation. For this reason, the allocation of intergovernmental transfers 
is done without the accurate calculation. Finally, all the transfers, especially 
general allocation grant (DAU), the most important transfer, is allocated 
based on variables which are assumed could represent the local fiscal needs.   
It is obvious to see that the previous problem is one of the existing 
problems that has not been solved during the 5 (five) years implementation of 
fiscal decentralization. This problem arose because Indonesia does not have 
the Minimum Service Standard (MSS) yet. MSS is the important source in 
determining the SSA. 
It is important to know that MSS is built based on Obligatory Functions 
(OF). MSS are found in many countries. They may be self-imposed standards 
for a given level of government. On the other hand, OF are discernible in 
many countries under various technology or formulations. For instance, they 
may be described in legal documents as mandatory or essential functions, or 
as duties of sub-national governments. 
Whether the Government of Indonesia is able to craft a suitable 
prescriptive system is doubtful at the moment. Difficulties of data and 
measurement are technical constraints that are amenable to solutions. 
Difficulties with sectoral cooperation, institutional interests that hinder 
allocation shifts and the general reluctance to increase accountability in 
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 spending pose more significant hurdles. To solve these issues and to allow a 
coherent OF/MSS model will take considerable political will.  
The search for an OF/MSS model in Indonesia indicates that more 
attention needs to be paid in decentralization efforts to the challenge of 
retaining the levers for exerting national influence over local government on 
important national and international commitments to key public services. In 
this respect, even if the Indonesian model is not properly elaborated and 
executed, it does suggest that there may be alternatives worth exploring to the 
current mainstream use of conditional grants/special allocation grant (DAK) 
that historically have tended to proliferate and unduly limit local autonomy.      
The establishment of detailed service standards, minimum or 
otherwise, may be left until after actual experience of several years has been 
accumulated. In the meantime, the government should use the currently 
existing standards for the purposes of planning, programming and budgeting. 
More importantly, efforts should be made to construct the mechanisms for 
monitoring and evaluation of local governments’ performance in public 
service provisions, and the mechanism for the central government’s assistance 
or interventions in cases of egregiously poor performances on the part of local 
governments (e.g. through the use of DAK). This approach would not only 
obviate time and efforts for working out the minimum service standard now, 
but also serve the spirit of local autonomy better. 
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 IV.4 Addressing Better DAK Management 
Two brief comments on DAK are in order. First, despite significant increases 
in recent years the DAK expenditures remain relatively limited compared to 
the regular sectoral development expenditures of the central governments 
(DIP). In the medium run sectoral development funds (DIP) should be 
migrated into DAK. Whether this is a suitable option will depend to a 
significant decree on the willingness of sector departments to shift resources 
from DIP to the DAK, over which they have considerably less control. 
Increasing DAK funds that are regionally and functionally targeted could 
provide an important instrument to establish common minimum service 
standards and to address disparities in expenditure needs across Indonesia. In 
comparison to DIP funds that are not part of the local budgets (APBD), DAK 
funds are more transparent and can be used as complementary to local 
spending.  
The second point refers to the distribution of the DAK. With the 
notable exception of the DAK to finance government infrastructure that was 
allocated to finance government infrastructure in newly established 
governments, the DAK grants are widely dispersed across large numbers of 
receiving districts, for example in FY 2005, 333 local governments received 
education DAK. Allegedly, the allocation process of the DAK funds remain 
vulnerable to political interference, by regional governments, sectoral 
departments, and budgeting commissions of the parliament (DPR). In effect, 
the DAK grants seem to be used to cross-subsidize capital expenditures rather 
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 than as transfers specifically targeted to districts with serious infrastructure 
deficiencies. 
 
IV.5 Local Accountability for Service Delivery 
The Indonesian reforms have emphasized a gap filling approach to fiscal 
transfers that stress local autonomy with little concern for local accountability 
for service delivery (Eckardt and Shah, 2006). Analyzing the impacts of fiscal 
decentralization to the quality of local public service is complicated since 
measuring the appropriate indicators that can clarify those impacts is not an 
easy task.  
To assess the quality of local public services, the focus should be on the 
indicators such as poverty rate and human development index (HDI). During 
the first three years of fiscal decentralization, those two indicators apparently 
showed improving figures. HDI in most regions, for example, was higher in 
2002 compared to 1999. The poverty rate in most regions also showed 
significant decline in the same period. These promising figures might imply 
that the quality of basic public services during the decentralization era better 
fit local needs and well-targeted. However, that good performance might be 
more contributed by national program than local government programs. The 
poverty reduction program is more well-known as the national program that 
is cross-sectoral and cross-regional.  Moreover, Indonesia has not clarified the 
health roles and responsibilities of central and lower governments after three 
years of decentralization. Nor has the country moved to emphasize core 
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 public health functions, or seen marked improvements in specific areas such 
as infectious disease control, pharmaceuticals, and human resources.     
Also in the education sector, despite on average, districts governments 
in Indonesia do have more resources at their disposal than in the past, and 
allocation formula stipulates that poorer districts should receive larger 
transfers. Nevertheless, the central government expects districts to mobilize 
more of their own resources to supplement the transfers. 
 
IV.6 Issues and Problems of Fiscal Decentralization 
The revised Law 22 of 1999 (Law 32 of 2004) and Law 25 of 1999 (Law 33 of 
2004) are clearly a promising step to make the Indonesian decentralization 
work and to navigate the decentralization process into a right direction. There 
are several important spirits toward this direction. The main spirits of revised 
Law 22 of 1999 are to promote local democracy and local good governance 
that are consistent with the issues at national level. On the other hand, the 
revised Law 25 of 1999 encourages the idea of fiscal sustainability and more 
equalized intergovernmental transfers. Although, the spirits are basically 
what the government of Indonesia needs during the decentralization process, 
those main spirits were less addressed on the original version of the laws.  
A crucial thing that might still be missing from the revised law process 
is the law integration spirit that has caused, to some extent, difficult 
coordination between Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) and Ministry of 
Finance (MOF). Coordination is certainly a key word in decentralization 
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 process in Indonesia that needs a lot of improvement both among 
government ministries and between central and local governments. The 
sectoral laws, in the spirit of coordination, should, in turn, be adjusted to 
decentralized environment.  
The implementation of revised laws is then becoming a next difficult 
issue. The original laws of 22 of 1999 and 25 of 1999 still had a lot of 
unfinished homeworks with many necessary government regulations did not 
exist or have not been finished yet. The incoming of revised laws could help 
in certain cases but potentially, they could create more complication by 
having to make the new regulations or adjusting the old ones. The political 
will of both central and local governments will be a basic requirement to 
succeed in this tiring and exhausting step. Strong political will then has to be 
accompanied by competent human resources and managerial capacity, 
especially at local level. The revised Law 22 of 1999 has touched the issue of 
human resources by allowing the movement of civil servant among regions 
but the most fundamental case is the quality of civil servant themselves. A 
continuing capacity building is still a must after about five years of 
decentralization onward. 
Another implementation problem that needs to be revolved is the 
administrative duplication or competition between central government 
(through line ministries) and local government. The experience of 
Government Regulation (PP) 25 of 2000 that failed to clearly define 
devolution of authorities has to be a lesson to be improved in the government 
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 regulations following the issuance of revised Law 22 of 1999 and 25 of 1999. 
The PP should be detailed enough to avoid the duplication or conflict 
between levels of government. The better government regulations could be a 
good start toward the realization of “finance follows functions” principle that 
implicitly demonstrates the consistency between the decentralization laws. At 
the same time, more political will from central government will be really 
needed to adjust first the sectoral laws with revised Law 22 of 1999 and 25 of 
1999, and then to reduce the power of line ministries in relation with local 
governments. Line ministries should promote the gradual transfer from 
deconcentration activities (also known as DIP activities) into decentralization 
activities. The empowerment of specific allocation fund (DAK) will be a good 
solution for that.   
Aside from potential political and administrative decentralization 
problems, there will be some fiscal decentralization problems to be watched 
for. First is the proposed implementation of no hold-harmless DAU provision 
in the beginning 2008. The central governments should anticipate the possible 
resistance of those local governments since there will be some zero DAU local 
governments. It is better if the central government beginning the socialization 
of the process earlier before 2008 and preparing better disbursement 
mechanism of natural resources revenue sharing to ensure better cash flow 
management of the resources rich local governments that could be the ones 
with zero DAU. Second, the relatively weak local taxing power substantiated 
by the failure of shifting the land and property tax authority to the local 
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 governments. This could imply to various different effects. One of them is no 
existence of the “tax price” to local residents where they have less incentive to 
hold the local governments accountable in delivering basic public services. 
Another is no existence of appropriate local fiscal incentives that potentially 
discourage the local governments in pursuing the GDRP growth, and instead, 
focusing on APBD growth. Third is the possible implementation of local 
borrowing and local bond issuing in the near future following more detailed 
explanation in the revised Law 25 of 1999. Since the needs for local borrowing, 
especially to build and maintain the deterioting infrastructures, could be 
unavoidable, the central government has issued some safety guards in the 
revised Law 25 of 1999 through hard budget constraint concept and limitation 
of cumulative central and local borrowings. The commitments from both 
central and local governments in maintaining the principle will be very 
crucial in avoiding Indonesia to be the “second Brazil”. 
Despite some missing important parts and skepticism over the 
government political will, the revised Law 22 of 1999 and 25 of 1999 has 
contributed quite significantly to maintain the Indonesian decentralization 
path toward a more ideal form. The revised laws are quite responsive in some 
issues that have been continuing problems during the first three years of 
implementation. Some parts of the laws even deal with small but quite 
important thing such as the new regulation to protect the fishermen when 
they have to sail to another local governmental coastal territory. The spirit to 
promote investment at local level is also a quick response over the business 
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 sector complaints toward behavior of some local governments. It is not 
overstating if ones can conclude that the government has not really wasted 
their time and energy in revising the laws and they might have reached sub-
optimal solution to keep the decentralization process at the right track 
(Brodjonegoro 2006).  
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 CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
 
V.1 CONCLUSION 
The previous entire analysis leads to a conclusion that fiscal decentralization 
in Indonesia is still in the process toward the more ideal form of 
decentralization. After five years of decentralization, both national and 
international communities praised the big-bang approach of Indonesian 
decentralization as a success. However, in spite of the success, there are some 
important issues come into consideration.  
First, the Indonesian local taxing power is still weak. The current 
approach devolves expenditure authority more seriously than tax authority 
and supports a strong role of the national government on the revenue side. 
This leads to the condition of local governments’ high reliance on transfers 
from the central. Moreover, there is also no adequate incentive for the local 
governments to upgrade their capacity in generating more local revenues 
since most of important taxes are managed by the central. As a result, the 
empirical evidence showed that in FY 2004 the performance of local own 
revenue was very poor in term of share and growth. 
Second, the hold-harmless provision, in fact, has worsened the 
equalization objective of the general allocation fund (DAU). The inclusion of 
this provision in the DAU allocation could not be avoided due to political 
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 reason. As a result, the role of the DAU formula was relatively not significant. 
Fortunately, this provision will be eliminated in the beginning FY 2008. 
However, the elimination of hold harmless provision is still linked to the 
existence of basic allocation. It was found that from FY 2001 to 2004, due to 
the increasing role of the Fiscal Gap Formula (as a part of the DAU 
Components), the equalization became better year to year.   
Third, although the Indonesian reforms have emphasized a gap filling 
approach to fiscal transfers that stress local autonomy but there is still only 
little concern for local accountability for service delivery. There is need to a 
have a more balanced approach which further strengthens autonomy while 
creating incentives for accountable local governance. 
The last but also an important issue is the weak coordination among 
the levels of government. This is issue even has not been addressed totally by 
the newly revised local autonomy and fiscal decentralization although its 
importance in the success implementation of the local governments reform.  
 
V.2 RECOMMENDATION 
Addressing the previous issues, there are some recommendations come into 
consideration.  
First, if Indonesia is to benefit from the fiscal decentralization effects 
greater, sub-national taxation autonomy is indeed a necessary institutional 
prerequisite. The assignment of some significant tax bases, like property tax 
or a piggybacked income tax, to finance marginal public good provision has 
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 the potential to increase efficiency and accountability in local government 
operations. Only by choosing to pay higher or lower taxes at the margin can 
residents of sub-national jurisdictions choose the level of public services they 
want.  
Second, to retain the equalization objective, the hold-harmless 
provision should be gradually eliminated. At the same time the role of the 
DAU Formula (i.e. Fiscal Gap Formula) should be gradually increased. In 
order to attain the equalization objective better, the existence of non-formula 
components in the future DAU allocation should be limited since they are 
biased to the equalization.  
Third, dealing with the accountability matters, the local accountability 
for service delivery can be achieved by instituting out-put oriented national 
minimum standards grants for merit good such as education, health and 
roads. These grants could be allocated to local jurisdictions on the basis of 
simple service population (such as school age population for education 
grants) and onward distributed to local public and private providers based 
upon objective indicators of clients served (e.g. school enrollment) but 
continuation of grant in future years would depend upon meeting or 
improving on baseline service standards monitored directly by citizen-
customers. Indonesia in the pre-reform was a pioneer in instituting simple 
and objective performance oriented grants for education, health and roads 
and it would be useful to reintroduce similar transfers again. 
Finally, it should be understood that the success of fiscal 
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 decentralization cannot be achieved without proper coordination among the 
government levels. Indonesia needs a lot of improvement both among 
government ministries and between central and local governments. As well 
known, many sectoral laws have not amended since the enactment of the 
decentralization. They still refer to the pre-reform paradigm (i.e. 
centralization). Therefore, more coordination is required to ensure proper 
direction of decentralization toward the more ideal form. In doing so, the 
sectoral laws, in the spirit of coordination, should be adjusted to decentralized 
environment.       
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APPENDIX A.1
LOCAL OWN REVENUE (PAD) GROWTH 
No. Regency/Munipality Province Part of Indonesia PAD GROWTH (%)
1 Kab. Aceh Tamiang NAD Western Part 437.70
2 Kab. Penajam Paser Utara Kaltim Eastern Part 367.55
3 Kab. Aceh Barat Daya NAD Western Part 334.00
4 Kab. Paniai Papua Eastern Part 310.12
5 Kab. Fak-Fak Papua Eastern Part 261.39
6 Kab. Lombok Tengah NTB Eastern Part 221.99
7 Kota Ambon Maluku Eastern Part 167.73
8 Kab. Banyuasin Sumsel Western Part 136.72
9 Kota Tanjung Pinang Riau Western Part 129.56
10 Kab. Nagan Raya NAD Western Part 128.15
11 Kab. Rokan Hulu Riau Western Part 121.66
12 Kota Tebing Tinggi Sumut Western Part 118.24
13 Kab. Bekasi Jabar Western Part 117.48
14 Kab. Banggai Sulteng Eastern Part 105.14
15 Kab. Pasir Kaltim Eastern Part 76.29
16 Kota Kupang NTT Eastern Part 72.68
17 Kab. Nabire Papua Eastern Part 71.11
18 Kab. Rokan Hilir Riau Western Part 70.13
19 Kota Bitung Sulut Western Part 62.75
20 Kab. Batanghari Jambi Western Part 61.46
21 Kota Bengkulu Bengkulu Western Part 59.98
22 Kota Jambi Jambi Western Part 58.16
23 Kab. Tanah Laut Kalsel Eastern Part 55.10
24 Kota Sibolga Sumut Western Part 53.37
25 Kab. Lampung Tengah Lampung Western Part 52.18
26 Kab. Takalar Sulsel Eastern Part 50.43
27 Kab. Badung Bali Western Part 50.07
28 Kota Banda Aceh NAD Western Part 48.87
29 Kab. Polewali Mamasa Sulsel Eastern Part 47.74
30 Kab. Banjar Kalsel Eastern Part 46.45
31 Kab. Pelalawan Riau Western Part 45.76
32 Kab. Lombok Timur NTB Eastern Part 44.71
33 Kota Dumai Riau Western Part 43.43
34 Kab. Padang Pariaman Sumbar Western Part 42.54
35 Kab. Timor Tengah Utara NTT Eastern Part 42.46
36 Kab. Lampung Barat Lampung Western Part 40.73
37 Kab. Luwu Sulsel Eastern Part 38.71
38 Kota Gorontalo Gorontalo Eastern Part 38.64
39 Kab. Lahat Sumsel Western Part 37.71
40 Kab. Kampar Riau Western Part 37.54
41 Kab. Sinjai Sulsel Eastern Part 37.37
42 Kab. Sambas Kalbar Eastern Part 35.14
43 Kab. Pati Jateng Western Part 34.79
44 Kab. Lebak Banten Western Part 34.50
45 Kota Jayapura Papua Eastern Part 33.47
46 Kota Pangkal Pinang Babel Western Part 33.45
47 Kab. Aceh Selatan NAD Western Part 33.39
48 Kab. Tapanuli Tengah Sumut Western Part 32.99
49 Kota Metro Lampung Western Part 32.53
50 Kota Ternate Maluku Utara Eastern Part 32.00
51 Kab. Tangerang Banten Western Part 31.98
52 Kota Banjarmasin Kalsel Eastern Part 31.41
53 Kota Blitar Jatim Western Part 31.37
54 Kab. Tapin Kalsel Eastern Part 31.31
55 Kab. Kuantan Singingi Riau Western Part 29.98
56 Kab. Tanah Datar Sumbar Western Part 28.99
57 Kota Depok Jabar Western Part 27.91
58 Kab. Sumba Timur NTT Eastern Part 27.82
59 Kab. Tulang Bawang Lampung Western Part 27.41
60 Kab. Pasuruan Jatim Western Part 26.18
61 Kab. Tabanan Bali Western Part 25.37
62 Kab. Tanggamus Lampung Western Part 24.70
63 Kota Padang Panjang Sumbar Western Part 24.24
64 Kab. Kotawaringin Timur Kalteng Eastern Part 23.45
65 Kab. Tanah Karo Sumut Western Part 22.96
66 Kota Pekanbaru Riau Western Part 22.50
67 Kab. Gresik Jatim Western Part 22.36
68 Kab. Ngada NTT Eastern Part 22.34
69 Kota Bogor Jabar Western Part 22.17
70 Kab. Cianjur Jabar Western Part 22.10
71 Kab. Magelang Jateng Western Part 22.00
72 Kab. Kotawaringin Barat Kalteng Eastern Part 21.40
73 Kab. Lampung Utara Lampung Western Part 21.10
74 Kab. Banjarnegara Jateng Western Part 21.02
75 Kota Solok Sumbar Western Part 20.88
76 Kota Tegal Jateng Western Part 20.52
77 Kab. Purworejo Jateng Western Part 20.08
78 Kab. Sumedang Jabar Western Part 20.04
79 Kab. Pekalongan Jateng Western Part 19.75
80 Kab. Ketapang Kalbar Eastern Part 18.98
81 Kota Malang Jatim Western Part 18.80
82 Kota Bukit Tinggi Sumbar Western Part 18.18
83 Kab. Kapuas Kalteng Eastern Part 17.99
84 Kab. Alor NTT Eastern Part 17.67
85 Kota Tangerang Banten Western Part 17.41
86 Kab. Hulu Sungai Selatan Kalsel Eastern Part 17.40
87 Kota Sawahlunto Sumbar Western Part 17.03
88 Kab. Karanganyar Jateng Western Part 17.02
89 Kab. Musi Rawas Sumsel Western Part 16.92
90 Kota Cilegon Banten Western Part 16.88
91 Kota Yogyakarta Yogya Western Part 16.45
92 Kab. Tabalong Kalsel Eastern Part 16.35
93 Kab. Ciamis Jabar Western Part 16.19
94 Kota Langsa NAD Western Part 16.17
95 Kota Pekalongan Jateng Western Part 15.97
96 Kota Medan Sumut Western Part 15.12
97 Kab. Barru Sulsel Eastern Part 14.59
98 Kab. Barito Selatan Kalteng Eastern Part 14.48
99 Kab. Tana Toraja Sulsel Eastern Part 13.97
100 Kab. Banyumas Jateng Western Part 13.72
101 Kota Bekasi Jabar Western Part 13.62
102 Kab. Sleman Yogya Western Part 13.46
103 Kota Manado Sulut Western Part 13.32
104 Kota Bontang Kaltim Eastern Part 13.01
105 Kab. Jeneponto Sulsel Eastern Part 13.00
106 Kab. Boyolali Jateng Western Part 12.75
107 Kota Palangka Raya Kalteng Eastern Part 12.53
108 Kab. Maros Sulsel Eastern Part 12.46
109 Kota Bau-Bau Sultra Eastern Part 11.76
110 Kab. Bogor Jabar Western Part 11.64
111 Kota Pare-Pare Sulsel Eastern Part 11.63
112 Kota Balikpapan Kaltim Eastern Part 11.33
113 Kab. Kupang NTT Eastern Part 11.25
114 Kota Pontianak Kalbar Eastern Part 11.03
115 Kab. Bone Sulsel Eastern Part 10.89
116 Kab. Semarang Jateng Western Part 10.84
117 Kab. Sumba Barat NTT Eastern Part 10.80
118 Kab. Tasikmalaya Jabar Western Part 10.40
119 Kab. Serang Banten Western Part 9.87
120 Kab. Landak Kalbar Eastern Part 9.71
121 Kab. Blora Jateng Western Part 9.64
122 Kab. Lombok Barat NTB Eastern Part 9.32
123 Kab. Tuban Jatim Western Part 9.32
124 Kab. Lampung Selatan Lampung Western Part 9.02
125 Kab. Sukoharjo Jateng Western Part 8.89
126 Kota Semarang Jateng Western Part 8.85
127 Kab. Jember Jatim Western Part 8.83
128 Kab. Kapuas Hulu Kalbar Eastern Part 8.18
129 Kota Makassar Sulsel Eastern Part 8.12
130 Kab. Ende NTT Eastern Part 8.09
131 Kota Bandar Lampung Lampung Western Part 7.95
132 Kab. Sidenreng Rappang Sulsel Eastern Part 7.53
133 Kota Padang Sumbar Western Part 7.37
134 Kab. Kudus Jateng Western Part 7.14
135 Kota Salatiga Jateng Western Part 7.12
136 Kab. Madiun Jatim Western Part 6.90
137 Kota Tanjung Balai Sumut Western Part 6.68
138 Kab. Pontianak Kalbar Eastern Part 6.63
139 Kab. Asahan Sumut Western Part 6.41
140 Kab. Mojokerto Jatim Western Part 6.16
141 Kab. Majalengka Jabar Western Part 6.02
142 Kab. Pangkajene dan Kepulauan Sulsel Eastern Part 5.64
143 Kab. Barito Utara Kalteng Eastern Part 5.57
144 Kab. Temanggung Jateng Western Part 5.34
145 Kab. Subang Jabar Western Part 5.29
146 Kab. Lamongan Jatim Western Part 5.25
147 Kab. Sidoarjo Jatim Western Part 5.11
148 Kab. Agam Sumbar Western Part 4.45
149 Kab. Timor Tengah Selatan NTT Eastern Part 4.06
150 Kab. Tanjung Jabung Barat Jambi Western Part 3.69
151 Kab. Karawang Jabar Western Part 2.68
152 Kota Denpasar Bali Western Part 2.57
153 Kota Binjai Sumut Western Part 2.36
154 Kab. Rembang Jateng Western Part 2.30
155 Kota Sukabumi Jabar Western Part 2.29
156 Kab. Brebes Jateng Western Part 1.77
157 Kab. Tegal Jateng Western Part 1.76
158 Kota Kendari Sultra Eastern Part 1.58
159 Kab. Batang Jateng Western Part 1.30
160 Kab. Karangasem Bali Western Part 1.28
161 Kab. Ngawi Jatim Western Part 1.05
162 Kab. Aceh Utara NAD Western Part 0.67
163 Kab. Enrekang Sulsel Eastern Part 0.32
164 Kab. Barito Kuala Kalsel Eastern Part 0.01
165 Kab. Bandung Jabar Western Part -1.26
166 Kab. Bangkalan Jatim Western Part -1.46
167 Kab. Yapen Waropen Papua Eastern Part -1.79
168 Kab. Malang Jatim Western Part -2.07
169 Kab. Belu NTT Eastern Part -2.48
170 Kab. Klungkung Bali Western Part -2.62
171 Kab. Wonogiri Jateng Western Part -2.72
172 Kab. Muara Enim Sumsel Western Part -3.02
173 Kota Palembang Sumsel Western Part -3.05
174 Kota Samarinda Kaltim Eastern Part -3.76
175 Kota Bandung Jabar Western Part -3.80
176 Kab. Sikka NTT Eastern Part -4.13
177 Kab. Indragiri Hilir Riau Western Part -4.55
178 Kab. Kutai Barat Kaltim Eastern Part -4.97
179 Kab. Bantul Yogya Western Part -6.40
180 Kab. Bangli Bali Western Part -7.12
181 Kab. Majene Sulsel Eastern Part -7.21
182 Kab. Sukabumi Jabar Western Part -7.52
183 Kab. Selayar Sulsel Eastern Part -7.61
184 Kab. Bungo Jambi Western Part -7.74
185 Kab. Wajo Sulsel Eastern Part -8.37
186 Kab. Bima NTB Eastern Part -8.38
187 Kab. Sangihe Talaud Sulut Eastern Part -9.17
188 Kab. Gowa Sulsel Eastern Part -9.26
189 Kab. Cirebon Jabar Western Part -9.94
190 Kab. Kebumen Jateng Western Part -11.88
191 Kab. Jembrana Bali Western Part -12.04
192 Kab. Jepara Jateng Western Part -12.05
193 Kab. Hulu Sungai Tengah Kalsel Eastern Part -12.06
194 Kab. Bondowoso Jatim Western Part -12.21
195 Kab. Aceh Tenggara NAD Western Part -12.96
196 Kab. Banyuwangi Jatim Western Part -13.56
197 Kab. Kendal Jateng Western Part -14.80
198 Kab. Situbondo Jatim Western Part -16.16
199 Kab. Soppeng Sulsel Eastern Part -16.52
200 Kab. Tapanuli Selatan Sumut Western Part -17.00
201 Kab. Kulon Progo Yogya Western Part -17.49
202 Kab. Simalungun Sumut Western Part -18.71
203 Kab. Dompu NTB Eastern Part -19.12
204 Kab. Tanjung Jabung Timur Jambi Western Part -19.47
205 Kota Lhokseumawe NAD Western Part -23.57
206 Kab. Pesisir Selatan Sumbar Western Part -24.11
207 Kab. Indramayu Jabar Western Part -26.34
208 Kota Lubuk Linggau Sumsel Western Part -34.29
209 Kab. Karimun Riau Western Part -37.65
210 Kab. Lima Puluh Kota Sumbar Western Part -41.36
211 Kab. Muaro Jambi Jambi Western Part -51.11
212 Kota Magelang Jateng Western Part -52.04
213 Kab. Musi Banyuasin Sumsel Western Part -60.26
214 Kab. Halmahera Tengah Maluku Utara Eastern Part -63.63
APPENDIX A.1
LOCAL OWN REVENUE (PAD) SHARE ON LOCAL SPENDING FOR FY 2004
No. Regency/Munipality Province Part of Indonesia SHARE 2004 (%)
1 Kab. Badung Bali Western Part 60.44
2 Kota Cilegon Banten Western Part 35.52
3 Kab. Bekasi Jabar Western Part 33.96
4 Kota Denpasar Bali Western Part 26.06
5 Kota Medan Sumut Western Part 25.68
6 Kota Semarang Jateng Western Part 23.56
7 Kota Yogyakarta Yogya Western Part 21.58
8 Kota Bandung Jabar Western Part 21.02
9 Kota Tangerang Banten Western Part 19.60
10 Kab. Sidoarjo Jatim Western Part 19.45
11 Kota Kupang NTT Eastern Part 18.49
12 Kab. Bogor Jabar Western Part 17.20
13 Kab. Tangerang Banten Western Part 17.16
14 Kab. Fak-Fak Papua Eastern Part 16.97
15 Kota Padang Sumbar Western Part 16.88
16 Kab. Karimun Riau Western Part 16.82
17 Kota Tegal Jateng Western Part 16.81
18 Kab. Gresik Jatim Western Part 16.69
19 Kota Bekasi Jabar Western Part 16.27
20 Kota Makassar Sulsel Eastern Part 15.56
21 Kota Pekanbaru Riau Western Part 14.85
22 Kota Blitar Jatim Western Part 14.69
23 Kab. Tuban Jatim Western Part 14.13
24 Kota Malang Jatim Western Part 13.81
25 Kota Bogor Jabar Western Part 13.68
26 Kab. Tabanan Bali Western Part 13.66
27 Kab. Rokan Hulu Riau Western Part 13.21
28 Kab. Pangkajene dan Kepulauan Sulsel Eastern Part 12.95
29 Kota Banjarmasin Kalsel Eastern Part 12.87
30 Kab. Serang Banten Western Part 12.82
31 Kota Salatiga Jateng Western Part 12.80
32 Kab. Lombok Tengah NTB Eastern Part 12.77
33 Kota Manado Sulut Western Part 12.61
34 Kab. Pati Jateng Western Part 12.58
35 Kota Sukabumi Jabar Western Part 12.52
36 Kab. Sleman Yogya Western Part 12.52
37 Kab. Kotawaringin Timur Kalteng Eastern Part 12.45
38 Kab. Kudus Jateng Western Part 12.40
39 Kota Pontianak Kalbar Eastern Part 12.36
40 Kab. Semarang Jateng Western Part 12.28
41 Kab. Jepara Jateng Western Part 12.26
42 Kota Depok Jabar Western Part 12.21
43 Kab. Karawang Jabar Western Part 11.76
44 Kota Jambi Jambi Western Part 11.74
45 Kota Balikpapan Kaltim Eastern Part 11.58
46 Kota Bukit Tinggi Sumbar Western Part 11.46
47 Kab. Sumedang Jabar Western Part 11.37
48 Kab. Subang Jabar Western Part 11.12
49 Kab. Kotawaringin Barat Kalteng Eastern Part 10.82
50 Kab. Pasuruan Jatim Western Part 10.58
51 Kab. Banyumas Jateng Western Part 10.49
52 Kab. Magelang Jateng Western Part 10.46
53 Kota Bandar Lampung Lampung Western Part 10.31
54 Kota Palembang Sumsel Western Part 10.14
55 Kota Tanjung Pinang Riau Western Part 10.13
56 Kab. Bungo Jambi Western Part 9.87
57 Kota Pare-Pare Sulsel Eastern Part 9.78
58 Kab. Kupang NTT Eastern Part 9.64
59 Kab. Boyolali Jateng Western Part 9.34
60 Kota Pangkal Pinang Babel Western Part 9.28
61 Kota Gorontalo Gorontalo Eastern Part 9.13
62 Kota Ambon Maluku Eastern Part 8.98
63 Kab. Mojokerto Jatim Western Part 8.89
64 Kab. Banjarnegara Jateng Western Part 8.88
65 Kab. Tegal Jateng Western Part 8.88
66 Kota Solok Sumbar Western Part 8.86
67 Kota Pekalongan Jateng Western Part 8.80
68 Kota Samarinda Kaltim Eastern Part 8.77
69 Kab. Pekalongan Jateng Western Part 8.74
70 Kab. Bandung Jabar Western Part 8.71
71 Kab. Karanganyar Jateng Western Part 8.40
72 Kota Sawahlunto Sumbar Western Part 8.38
73 Kab. Lombok Timur NTB Eastern Part 8.30
74 Kab. Lamongan Jatim Western Part 8.19
75 Kab. Rokan Hilir Riau Western Part 8.15
76 Kab. Tabalong Kalsel Eastern Part 7.99
77 Kab. Kendal Jateng Western Part 7.98
78 Kab. Blora Jateng Western Part 7.82
79 Kab. Tanjung Jabung Barat Jambi Western Part 7.81
80 Kab. Karangasem Bali Western Part 7.77
81 Kab. Bantul Yogya Western Part 7.76
82 Kab. Lombok Barat NTB Eastern Part 7.63
83 Kota Padang Panjang Sumbar Western Part 7.57
84 Kab. Banyuwangi Jatim Western Part 7.53
85 Kab. Tanah Laut Kalsel Eastern Part 7.50
86 Kab. Timor Tengah Selatan NTT Eastern Part 7.45
87 Kab. Purworejo Jateng Western Part 7.43
88 Kota Bengkulu Bengkulu Western Part 7.27
89 Kab. Batang Jateng Western Part 7.26
90 Kab. Cirebon Jabar Western Part 7.22
91 Kota Kendari Sultra Eastern Part 7.13
92 Kab. Muara Enim Sumsel Western Part 7.05
93 Kota Bitung Sulut Western Part 7.05
94 Kab. Cianjur Jabar Western Part 7.04
95 Kab. Gowa Sulsel Eastern Part 7.04
96 Kota Tebing Tinggi Sumut Western Part 6.98
97 Kab. Wajo Sulsel Eastern Part 6.63
98 Kab. Sinjai Sulsel Eastern Part 6.61
99 Kab. Sukoharjo Jateng Western Part 6.61
100 Kab. Jember Jatim Western Part 6.58
101 Kota Sibolga Sumut Western Part 6.56
102 Kab. Padang Pariaman Sumbar Western Part 6.54
103 Kab. Rembang Jateng Western Part 6.53
104 Kab. Tanah Datar Sumbar Western Part 6.50
105 Kab. Madiun Jatim Western Part 6.48
106 Kota Magelang Jateng Western Part 6.44
107 Kab. Tapin Kalsel Eastern Part 6.40
108 Kab. Temanggung Jateng Western Part 6.37
109 Kab. Kulon Progo Yogya Western Part 6.37
110 Kab. Ngawi Jatim Western Part 6.37
111 Kab. Batanghari Jambi Western Part 6.35
112 Kota Tanjung Balai Sumut Western Part 6.32
113 Kab. Malang Jatim Western Part 6.30
114 Kota Jayapura Papua Eastern Part 6.26
115 Kota Metro Lampung Western Part 6.25
116 Kab. Kebumen Jateng Western Part 6.14
117 Kab. Sidenreng Rappang Sulsel Eastern Part 6.07
118 Kab. Bima NTB Eastern Part 6.06
119 Kab. Tana Toraja Sulsel Eastern Part 6.06
120 Kab. Pasir Kaltim Eastern Part 6.03
121 Kab. Wonogiri Jateng Western Part 5.99
122 Kab. Ciamis Jabar Western Part 5.96
123 Kab. Bondowoso Jatim Western Part 5.94
124 Kab. Banggai Sulteng Eastern Part 5.93
125 Kab. Majalengka Jabar Western Part 5.90
126 Kab. Sumba Timur NTT Eastern Part 5.84
127 Kab. Enrekang Sulsel Eastern Part 5.83
128 Kab. Klungkung Bali Western Part 5.80
129 Kab. Hulu Sungai Tengah Kalsel Eastern Part 5.76
130 Kab. Asahan Sumut Western Part 5.75
131 Kab. Maros Sulsel Eastern Part 5.74
132 Kab. Hulu Sungai Selatan Kalsel Eastern Part 5.73
133 Kab. Lebak Banten Western Part 5.67
134 Kota Ternate Maluku Utara Eastern Part 5.65
135 Kab. Alor NTT Eastern Part 5.56
136 Kab. Brebes Jateng Western Part 5.41
137 Kab. Bangkalan Jatim Western Part 5.40
138 Kab. Sumba Barat NTT Eastern Part 5.37
139 Kab. Barru Sulsel Eastern Part 5.34
140 Kab. Banjar Kalsel Eastern Part 5.32
141 Kab. Polewali Mamasa Sulsel Eastern Part 5.26
142 Kota Palangka Raya Kalteng Eastern Part 5.23
143 Kab. Sukabumi Jabar Western Part 5.19
144 Kab. Aceh Utara NAD Western Part 5.18
145 Kab. Bone Sulsel Eastern Part 5.10
146 Kota Dumai Riau Western Part 5.09
147 Kab. Kutai Barat Kaltim Eastern Part 5.03
148 Kota Lhokseumawe NAD Western Part 4.98
149 Kab. Kampar Riau Western Part 4.95
150 Kota Binjai Sumut Western Part 4.90
151 Kab. Ngada NTT Eastern Part 4.87
152 Kab. Lahat Sumsel Western Part 4.84
153 Kota Bau-Bau Sultra Eastern Part 4.77
154 Kab. Luwu Sulsel Eastern Part 4.77
155 Kab. Barito Kuala Kalsel Eastern Part 4.76
156 Kab. Barito Utara Kalteng Eastern Part 4.67
157 Kab. Indragiri Hilir Riau Western Part 4.66
158 Kab. Indramayu Jabar Western Part 4.64
159 Kab. Agam Sumbar Western Part 4.61
160 Kab. Jembrana Bali Western Part 4.59
161 Kota Lubuk Linggau Sumsel Western Part 4.59
162 Kab. Situbondo Jatim Western Part 4.58
163 Kab. Sikka NTT Eastern Part 4.47
164 Kota Banda Aceh NAD Western Part 4.39
165 Kab. Takalar Sulsel Eastern Part 4.36
166 Kab. Lima Puluh Kota Sumbar Western Part 4.32
167 Kab. Sangihe Talaud Sulut Eastern Part 4.28
168 Kab. Belu NTT Eastern Part 4.26
169 Kota Bontang Kaltim Eastern Part 4.15
170 Kab. Kapuas Kalteng Eastern Part 4.13
171 Kab. Ende NTT Eastern Part 4.12
172 Kab. Tasikmalaya Jabar Western Part 4.12
173 Kab. Timor Tengah Utara NTT Eastern Part 4.07
174 Kab. Bangli Bali Western Part 4.03
175 Kab. Dompu NTB Eastern Part 4.03
176 Kab. Sambas Kalbar Eastern Part 3.99
177 Kab. Tanah Karo Sumut Western Part 3.86
178 Kab. Paniai Papua Eastern Part 3.86
179 Kab. Ketapang Kalbar Eastern Part 3.84
180 Kab. Simalungun Sumut Western Part 3.62
181 Kab. Muaro Jambi Jambi Western Part 3.46
182 Kab. Soppeng Sulsel Eastern Part 3.44
183 Kab. Musi Rawas Sumsel Western Part 3.38
184 Kab. Tapanuli Tengah Sumut Western Part 3.34
185 Kab. Lampung Selatan Lampung Western Part 3.25
186 Kab. Kuantan Singingi Riau Western Part 3.17
187 Kab. Pontianak Kalbar Eastern Part 3.06
188 Kab. Lampung Utara Lampung Western Part 2.99
189 Kab. Pesisir Selatan Sumbar Western Part 2.98
190 Kab. Barito Selatan Kalteng Eastern Part 2.93
191 Kab. Jeneponto Sulsel Eastern Part 2.87
192 Kab. Pelalawan Riau Western Part 2.86
193 Kab. Tanjung Jabung Timur Jambi Western Part 2.77
194 Kab. Selayar Sulsel Eastern Part 2.67
195 Kab. Tanggamus Lampung Western Part 2.58
196 Kab. Aceh Tamiang NAD Western Part 2.49
197 Kab. Lampung Tengah Lampung Western Part 2.48
198 Kab. Tapanuli Selatan Sumut Western Part 2.46
199 Kab. Lampung Barat Lampung Western Part 2.46
200 Kab. Kapuas Hulu Kalbar Eastern Part 2.41
201 Kab. Aceh Tenggara NAD Western Part 2.39
202 Kab. Aceh Barat Daya NAD Western Part 2.11
203 Kab. Halmahera Tengah Maluku Utara Eastern Part 2.08
204 Kab. Nabire Papua Eastern Part 2.03
205 Kab. Majene Sulsel Eastern Part 1.96
206 Kab. Tulang Bawang Lampung Western Part 1.82
207 Kab. Banyuasin Sumsel Western Part 1.82
208 Kota Langsa NAD Western Part 1.79
209 Kab. Musi Banyuasin Sumsel Western Part 1.79
210 Kab. Aceh Selatan NAD Western Part 1.73
211 Kab. Yapen Waropen Papua Eastern Part 1.60
212 Kab. Nagan Raya NAD Western Part 1.55
213 Kab. Landak Kalbar Eastern Part 1.07
214 Kab. Penajam Paser Utara Kaltim Eastern Part 0.99
No. Regency/Municipality Province Part ofIndonesia SHARE 2004 PAD GROWTH
SHARE
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GROWTH
CRITERION
QUADRANT
1 Kab. Badung Bali Western Part 60.44 50.07 HIGH HIGH I
2 Kab. Bekasi Jabar Western Part 33.96 117.48 HIGH HIGH I
3 Kab. Fak-Fak Papua Eastern Part 16.97 261.39 HIGH HIGH I
4 Kab. Lombok Tengah NTB Eastern Part 12.77 221.99 HIGH HIGH I
5 Kab. Lombok Timur NTB Eastern Part 8.30 44.71 HIGH HIGH I
6 Kab. Pasuruan Jatim Western Part 10.58 26.18 HIGH HIGH I
7 Kab. Pati Jateng Western Part 12.58 34.79 HIGH HIGH I
8 Kab. Rokan Hulu Riau Western Part 13.21 121.66 HIGH HIGH I
9 Kab. Tabanan Bali Western Part 13.66 25.37 HIGH HIGH I
10 Kab. Tangerang Banten Western Part 17.16 31.98 HIGH HIGH I
11 Kota Ambon Maluku Eastern Part 8.98 167.73 HIGH HIGH I
12 Kota Banjarmasin Kalsel Eastern Part 12.87 31.41 HIGH HIGH I
13 Kota Blitar Jatim Western Part 14.69 31.37 HIGH HIGH I
14 Kota Depok Jabar Western Part 12.21 27.91 HIGH HIGH I
15 Kota Gorontalo Gorontalo Eastern Part 9.13 38.64 HIGH HIGH I
16 Kota Jambi Jambi Western Part 11.74 58.16 HIGH HIGH I
17 Kota Kupang NTT Eastern Part 18.49 72.68 HIGH HIGH I
18 Kota Pangkal Pinang Babel Western Part 9.28 33.45 HIGH HIGH I
19 Kota Tanjung Pinang Riau Western Part 10.13 129.56 HIGH HIGH I
20 Kab. Bandung Jabar Western Part 8.71 -1.26 HIGH LOW II
21 Kab. Banjarnegara Jateng Western Part 8.88 21.02 HIGH LOW II
22 Kab. Banyumas Jateng Western Part 10.49 13.72 HIGH LOW II
23 Kab. Bogor Jabar Western Part 17.20 11.64 HIGH LOW II
24 Kab. Boyolali Jateng Western Part 9.34 12.75 HIGH LOW II
25 Kab. Bungo Jambi Western Part 9.87 -7.74 HIGH LOW II
26 Kab. Gresik Jatim Western Part 16.69 22.36 HIGH LOW II
27 Kab. Jepara Jateng Western Part 12.26 -12.05 HIGH LOW II
28 Kab. Karanganyar Jateng Western Part 8.40 17.02 HIGH LOW II
29 Kab. Karawang Jabar Western Part 11.76 2.68 HIGH LOW II
30 Kab. Karimun Riau Western Part 16.82 -37.65 HIGH LOW II
31 Kab. Kotawaringin Barat Kalteng Eastern Part 10.82 21.40 HIGH LOW II
32 Kab. Kotawaringin Timur Kalteng Eastern Part 12.45 23.45 HIGH LOW II
33 Kab. Kudus Jateng Western Part 12.40 7.14 HIGH LOW II
34 Kab. Kupang NTT Eastern Part 9.64 11.25 HIGH LOW II
35 Kab. Lamongan Jatim Western Part 8.19 5.25 HIGH LOW II
36 Kab. Magelang Jateng Western Part 10.46 22.00 HIGH LOW II
37 Kab. Mojokerto Jatim Western Part 8.89 6.16 HIGH LOW II
38 Kab. Pangkajene dan Kepulauan Sulsel Eastern Part 12.95 5.64 HIGH LOW II
39 Kab. Pekalongan Jateng Western Part 8.74 19.75 HIGH LOW II
40 Kab. Semarang Jateng Western Part 12.28 10.84 HIGH LOW II
41 Kab. Serang Banten Western Part 12.82 9.87 HIGH LOW II
42 Kab. Sidoarjo Jatim Western Part 19.45 5.11 HIGH LOW II
43 Kab. Sleman Yogya Western Part 12.52 13.46 HIGH LOW II
44 Kab. Subang Jabar Western Part 11.12 5.29 HIGH LOW II
45 Kab. Sumedang Jabar Western Part 11.37 20.04 HIGH LOW II
46 Kab. Tegal Jateng Western Part 8.88 1.76 HIGH LOW II
47 Kab. Tuban Jatim Western Part 14.13 9.32 HIGH LOW II
48 Kota Balikpapan Kaltim Eastern Part 11.58 11.33 HIGH LOW II
49 Kota Bandar Lampung Lampung Western Part 10.31 7.95 HIGH LOW II
50 Kota Bandung Jabar Western Part 21.02 -3.80 HIGH LOW II
51 Kota Bekasi Jabar Western Part 16.27 13.62 HIGH LOW II
52 Kota Bogor Jabar Western Part 13.68 22.17 HIGH LOW II
53 Kota Bukit Tinggi Sumbar Western Part 11.46 18.18 HIGH LOW II
54 Kota Cilegon Banten Western Part 35.52 16.88 HIGH LOW II
55 Kota Denpasar Bali Western Part 26.06 2.57 HIGH LOW II
56 Kota Makassar Sulsel Eastern Part 15.56 8.12 HIGH LOW II
57 Kota Malang Jatim Western Part 13.81 18.80 HIGH LOW II
58 Kota Manado Sulut Western Part 12.61 13.32 HIGH LOW II
59 Kota Medan Sumut Western Part 25.68 15.12 HIGH LOW II
60 Kota Padang Sumbar Western Part 16.88 7.37 HIGH LOW II
61 Kota Palembang Sumsel Western Part 10.14 -3.05 HIGH LOW II
62 Kota Pare-Pare Sulsel Eastern Part 9.78 11.63 HIGH LOW II
63 Kota Pekalongan Jateng Western Part 8.80 15.97 HIGH LOW II
64 Kota Pekanbaru Riau Western Part 14.85 22.50 HIGH LOW II
65 Kota Pontianak Kalbar Eastern Part 12.36 11.03 HIGH LOW II
66 Kota Salatiga Jateng Western Part 12.80 7.12 HIGH LOW II
67 Kota Samarinda Kaltim Eastern Part 8.77 -3.76 HIGH LOW II
68 Kota Sawahlunto Sumbar Western Part 8.38 17.03 HIGH LOW II
69 Kota Semarang Jateng Western Part 23.56 8.85 HIGH LOW II
70 Kota Solok Sumbar Western Part 8.86 20.88 HIGH LOW II
71 Kota Sukabumi Jabar Western Part 12.52 2.29 HIGH LOW II
72 Kota Tangerang Banten Western Part 19.60 17.41 HIGH LOW II
73 Kota Tegal Jateng Western Part 16.81 20.52 HIGH LOW II
74 Kota Yogyakarta Yogya Western Part 21.58 16.45 HIGH LOW II
75 Kab. Aceh Barat Daya NAD Western Part 2.11 334.00 LOW HIGH III
76 Kab. Aceh Selatan NAD Western Part 1.73 33.39 LOW HIGH III
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77 Kab. Aceh Tamiang NAD Western Part 2.49 437.70 LOW HIGH III
78 Kab. Banggai Sulteng Eastern Part 5.93 105.14 LOW HIGH III
79 Kab. Banjar Kalsel Eastern Part 5.32 46.45 LOW HIGH III
80 Kab. Banyuasin Sumsel Western Part 1.82 136.72 LOW HIGH III
81 Kab. Batanghari Jambi Western Part 6.35 61.46 LOW HIGH III
82 Kab. Kampar Riau Western Part 4.95 37.54 LOW HIGH III
83 Kab. Kuantan Singingi Riau Western Part 3.17 29.98 LOW HIGH III
84 Kab. Lahat Sumsel Western Part 4.84 37.71 LOW HIGH III
85 Kab. Lampung Barat Lampung Western Part 2.46 40.73 LOW HIGH III
86 Kab. Lampung Tengah Lampung Western Part 2.48 52.18 LOW HIGH III
87 Kab. Lebak Banten Western Part 5.67 34.50 LOW HIGH III
88 Kab. Luwu Sulsel Eastern Part 4.77 38.71 LOW HIGH III
89 Kab. Nabire Papua Eastern Part 2.03 71.11 LOW HIGH III
90 Kab. Nagan Raya NAD Western Part 1.55 128.15 LOW HIGH III
91 Kab. Padang Pariaman Sumbar Western Part 6.54 42.54 LOW HIGH III
92 Kab. Paniai Papua Eastern Part 3.86 310.12 LOW HIGH III
93 Kab. Pasir Kaltim Eastern Part 6.03 76.29 LOW HIGH III
94 Kab. Pelalawan Riau Western Part 2.86 45.76 LOW HIGH III
95 Kab. Penajam Paser Utara Kaltim Eastern Part 0.99 367.55 LOW HIGH III
96 Kab. Polewali Mamasa Sulsel Eastern Part 5.26 47.74 LOW HIGH III
97 Kab. Rokan Hilir Riau Western Part 8.15 70.13 LOW HIGH III
98 Kab. Sambas Kalbar Eastern Part 3.99 35.14 LOW HIGH III
99 Kab. Sinjai Sulsel Eastern Part 6.61 37.37 LOW HIGH III
100 Kab. Sumba Timur NTT Eastern Part 5.84 27.82 LOW HIGH III
101 Kab. Takalar Sulsel Eastern Part 4.36 50.43 LOW HIGH III
102 Kab. Tanah Datar Sumbar Western Part 6.50 28.99 LOW HIGH III
103 Kab. Tanah Laut Kalsel Eastern Part 7.50 55.10 LOW HIGH III
104 Kab. Tapanuli Tengah Sumut Western Part 3.34 32.99 LOW HIGH III
105 Kab. Tapin Kalsel Eastern Part 6.40 31.31 LOW HIGH III
106 Kab. Timor Tengah Utara NTT Eastern Part 4.07 42.46 LOW HIGH III
107 Kab. Tulang Bawang Lampung Western Part 1.82 27.41 LOW HIGH III
108 Kota Banda Aceh NAD Western Part 4.39 48.87 LOW HIGH III
109 Kota Bengkulu Bengkulu Western Part 7.27 59.98 LOW HIGH III
110 Kota Bitung Sulut Western Part 7.05 62.75 LOW HIGH III
111 Kota Dumai Riau Western Part 5.09 43.43 LOW HIGH III
112 Kota Jayapura Papua Eastern Part 6.26 33.47 LOW HIGH III
113 Kota Metro Lampung Western Part 6.25 32.53 LOW HIGH III
114 Kota Sibolga Sumut Western Part 6.56 53.37 LOW HIGH III
115 Kota Tebing Tinggi Sumut Western Part 6.98 118.24 LOW HIGH III
116 Kota Ternate Maluku Utara Eastern Part 5.65 32.00 LOW HIGH III
117 Kab. Aceh Tenggara NAD Western Part 2.39 -12.96 LOW LOW IV
118 Kab. Aceh Utara NAD Western Part 5.18 0.67 LOW LOW IV
119 Kab. Agam Sumbar Western Part 4.61 4.45 LOW LOW IV
120 Kab. Alor NTT Eastern Part 5.56 17.67 LOW LOW IV
121 Kab. Asahan Sumut Western Part 5.75 6.41 LOW LOW IV
122 Kab. Bangkalan Jatim Western Part 5.40 -1.46 LOW LOW IV
123 Kab. Bangli Bali Western Part 4.03 -7.12 LOW LOW IV
124 Kab. Bantul Yogya Western Part 7.76 -6.40 LOW LOW IV
125 Kab. Banyuwangi Jatim Western Part 7.53 -13.56 LOW LOW IV
126 Kab. Barito Kuala Kalsel Eastern Part 4.76 0.01 LOW LOW IV
127 Kab. Barito Selatan Kalteng Eastern Part 2.93 14.48 LOW LOW IV
128 Kab. Barito Utara Kalteng Eastern Part 4.67 5.57 LOW LOW IV
129 Kab. Barru Sulsel Eastern Part 5.34 14.59 LOW LOW IV
130 Kab. Batang Jateng Western Part 7.26 1.30 LOW LOW IV
131 Kab. Belu NTT Eastern Part 4.26 -2.48 LOW LOW IV
132 Kab. Bima NTB Eastern Part 6.06 -8.38 LOW LOW IV
133 Kab. Blora Jateng Western Part 7.82 9.64 LOW LOW IV
134 Kab. Bondowoso Jatim Western Part 5.94 -12.21 LOW LOW IV
135 Kab. Bone Sulsel Eastern Part 5.10 10.89 LOW LOW IV
136 Kab. Brebes Jateng Western Part 5.41 1.77 LOW LOW IV
137 Kab. Ciamis Jabar Western Part 5.96 16.19 LOW LOW IV
138 Kab. Cianjur Jabar Western Part 7.04 22.10 LOW LOW IV
139 Kab. Cirebon Jabar Western Part 7.22 -9.94 LOW LOW IV
140 Kab. Dompu NTB Eastern Part 4.03 -19.12 LOW LOW IV
141 Kab. Ende NTT Eastern Part 4.12 8.09 LOW LOW IV
142 Kab. Enrekang Sulsel Eastern Part 5.83 0.32 LOW LOW IV
143 Kab. Gowa Sulsel Eastern Part 7.04 -9.26 LOW LOW IV
144 Kab. Halmahera Tengah Maluku Utara Eastern Part 2.08 -63.63 LOW LOW IV
145 Kab. Hulu Sungai Selatan Kalsel Eastern Part 5.73 17.40 LOW LOW IV
146 Kab. Hulu Sungai Tengah Kalsel Eastern Part 5.76 -12.06 LOW LOW IV
147 Kab. Indragiri Hilir Riau Western Part 4.66 -4.55 LOW LOW IV
148 Kab. Indramayu Jabar Western Part 4.64 -26.34 LOW LOW IV
149 Kab. Jember Jatim Western Part 6.58 8.83 LOW LOW IV
150 Kab. Jembrana Bali Western Part 4.59 -12.04 LOW LOW IV
151 Kab. Jeneponto Sulsel Eastern Part 2.87 13.00 LOW LOW IV
152 Kab. Kapuas Kalteng Eastern Part 4.13 17.99 LOW LOW IV
153 Kab. Kapuas Hulu Kalbar Eastern Part 2.41 8.18 LOW LOW IV
154 Kab. Karangasem Bali Western Part 7.77 1.28 LOW LOW IV
155 Kab. Kebumen Jateng Western Part 6.14 -11.88 LOW LOW IV
156 Kab. Kendal Jateng Western Part 7.98 -14.80 LOW LOW IV
157 Kab. Ketapang Kalbar Eastern Part 3.84 18.98 LOW LOW IV
158 Kab. Klungkung Bali Western Part 5.80 -2.62 LOW LOW IV
159 Kab. Kulon Progo Yogya Western Part 6.37 -17.49 LOW LOW IV
160 Kab. Kutai Barat Kaltim Eastern Part 5.03 -4.97 LOW LOW IV
161 Kab. Lampung Selatan Lampung Western Part 3.25 9.02 LOW LOW IV
162 Kab. Lampung Utara Lampung Western Part 2.99 21.10 LOW LOW IV
163 Kab. Landak Kalbar Eastern Part 1.07 9.71 LOW LOW IV
164 Kab. Lima Puluh Kota Sumbar Western Part 4.32 -41.36 LOW LOW IV
165 Kab. Lombok Barat NTB Eastern Part 7.63 9.32 LOW LOW IV
166 Kab. Madiun Jatim Western Part 6.48 6.90 LOW LOW IV
167 Kab. Majalengka Jabar Western Part 5.90 6.02 LOW LOW IV
168 Kab. Majene Sulsel Eastern Part 1.96 -7.21 LOW LOW IV
169 Kab. Malang Jatim Western Part 6.30 -2.07 LOW LOW IV
170 Kab. Maros Sulsel Eastern Part 5.74 12.46 LOW LOW IV
171 Kab. Muara Enim Sumsel Western Part 7.05 -3.02 LOW LOW IV
172 Kab. Muaro Jambi Jambi Western Part 3.46 -51.11 LOW LOW IV
173 Kab. Musi Banyuasin Sumsel Western Part 1.79 -60.26 LOW LOW IV
174 Kab. Musi Rawas Sumsel Western Part 3.38 16.92 LOW LOW IV
175 Kab. Ngada NTT Eastern Part 4.87 22.34 LOW LOW IV
176 Kab. Ngawi Jatim Western Part 6.37 1.05 LOW LOW IV
177 Kab. Pesisir Selatan Sumbar Western Part 2.98 -24.11 LOW LOW IV
178 Kab. Pontianak Kalbar Eastern Part 3.06 6.63 LOW LOW IV
179 Kab. Purworejo Jateng Western Part 7.43 20.08 LOW LOW IV
180 Kab. Rembang Jateng Western Part 6.53 2.30 LOW LOW IV
181 Kab. Sangihe Talaud Sulut Eastern Part 4.28 -9.17 LOW LOW IV
182 Kab. Selayar Sulsel Eastern Part 2.67 -7.61 LOW LOW IV
183 Kab. Sidenreng Rappang Sulsel Eastern Part 6.07 7.53 LOW LOW IV
184 Kab. Sikka NTT Eastern Part 4.47 -4.13 LOW LOW IV
185 Kab. Simalungun Sumut Western Part 3.62 -18.71 LOW LOW IV
186 Kab. Situbondo Jatim Western Part 4.58 -16.16 LOW LOW IV
187 Kab. Soppeng Sulsel Eastern Part 3.44 -16.52 LOW LOW IV
188 Kab. Sukabumi Jabar Western Part 5.19 -7.52 LOW LOW IV
189 Kab. Sukoharjo Jateng Western Part 6.61 8.89 LOW LOW IV
190 Kab. Sumba Barat NTT Eastern Part 5.37 10.80 LOW LOW IV
191 Kab. Tabalong Kalsel Eastern Part 7.99 16.35 LOW LOW IV
192 Kab. Tana Toraja Sulsel Eastern Part 6.06 13.97 LOW LOW IV
193 Kab. Tanah Karo Sumut Western Part 3.86 22.96 LOW LOW IV
194 Kab. Tanggamus Lampung Western Part 2.58 24.70 LOW LOW IV
195 Kab. Tanjung Jabung Barat Jambi Western Part 7.81 3.69 LOW LOW IV
196 Kab. Tanjung Jabung Timur Jambi Western Part 2.77 -19.47 LOW LOW IV
197 Kab. Tapanuli Selatan Sumut Western Part 2.46 -17.00 LOW LOW IV
198 Kab. Tasikmalaya Jabar Western Part 4.12 10.40 LOW LOW IV
199 Kab. Temanggung Jateng Western Part 6.37 5.34 LOW LOW IV
200 Kab. Timor Tengah Selatan NTT Eastern Part 7.45 4.06 LOW LOW IV
201 Kab. Wajo Sulsel Eastern Part 6.63 -8.37 LOW LOW IV
202 Kab. Wonogiri Jateng Western Part 5.99 -2.72 LOW LOW IV
203 Kab. Yapen Waropen Papua Eastern Part 1.60 -1.79 LOW LOW IV
204 Kota Bau-Bau Sultra Eastern Part 4.77 11.76 LOW LOW IV
205 Kota Binjai Sumut Western Part 4.90 2.36 LOW LOW IV
206 Kota Bontang Kaltim Eastern Part 4.15 13.01 LOW LOW IV
207 Kota Kendari Sultra Eastern Part 7.13 1.58 LOW LOW IV
208 Kota Langsa NAD Western Part 1.79 16.17 LOW LOW IV
209 Kota Lhokseumawe NAD Western Part 4.98 -23.57 LOW LOW IV
210 Kota Lubuk Linggau Sumsel Western Part 4.59 -34.29 LOW LOW IV
211 Kota Magelang Jateng Western Part 6.44 -52.04 LOW LOW IV
212 Kota Padang Panjang Sumbar Western Part 7.57 24.24 LOW LOW IV
213 Kota Palangka Raya Kalteng Eastern Part 5.23 12.53 LOW LOW IV
214 Kota Tanjung Balai Sumut Western Part 6.32 6.68 LOW LOW IV
8.17 25.24AVERAGE
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Xg Xe Xs IFA
1 Kab. Aceh Tamiang NAD Western Part 2.49 0.99 60.44 0.03 437.70 -63.63 437.70 1.00 35.64 -5.98 35.64 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.03 0.68 ABOVE
2 Kab. Fak-Fak Papua Eastern Part 16.97 0.99 60.44 0.27 261.39 -63.63 437.70 0.65 28.75 -5.98 35.64 0.83 0.65 0.83 0.27 0.58 ABOVE
3 Kab. Aceh Barat Daya NAD Western Part 2.11 0.99 60.44 0.02 334.00 -63.63 437.70 0.79 31.67 -5.98 35.64 0.90 0.79 0.90 0.02 0.57 ABOVE
4 Kab. Penajam Paser Utara Kaltim Eastern Part 0.99 0.99 60.44 0.00 367.55 -63.63 437.70 0.86 23.89 -5.98 35.64 0.72 0.86 0.72 0.00 0.53 ABOVE
5 Kab. Badung Bali Western Part 60.44 0.99 60.44 1.00 50.07 -63.63 437.70 0.23 5.10 -5.98 35.64 0.27 0.23 0.27 1.00 0.50 ABOVE
6 Kab. Lombok Tengah NTB Eastern Part 12.77 0.99 60.44 0.20 221.99 -63.63 437.70 0.57 20.92 -5.98 35.64 0.65 0.57 0.65 0.20 0.47 ABOVE
7 Kab. Bekasi Jabar Western Part 33.96 0.99 60.44 0.55 117.48 -63.63 437.70 0.36 14.69 -5.98 35.64 0.50 0.36 0.50 0.55 0.47 ABOVE
8 Kab. Paniai Papua Eastern Part 3.86 0.99 60.44 0.05 310.12 -63.63 437.70 0.75 16.48 -5.98 35.64 0.54 0.75 0.54 0.05 0.44 ABOVE
9 Kota Ambon Maluku Eastern Part 8.98 0.99 60.44 0.13 167.73 -63.63 437.70 0.46 16.73 -5.98 35.64 0.55 0.46 0.55 0.13 0.38 ABOVE
10 Kota Kupang NTT Eastern Part 18.49 0.99 60.44 0.29 72.68 -63.63 437.70 0.27 12.44 -5.98 35.64 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.29 0.34 ABOVE
11 Kota Cilegon Banten Western Part 35.52 0.99 60.44 0.58 16.88 -63.63 437.70 0.16 1.42 -5.98 35.64 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.58 0.31 ABOVE
12 Kab. Rokan Hulu Riau Western Part 13.21 0.99 60.44 0.21 121.66 -63.63 437.70 0.37 5.49 -5.98 35.64 0.28 0.37 0.28 0.21 0.28 ABOVE
13 Kota Tanjung Pinang Riau Western Part 10.13 0.99 60.44 0.15 129.56 -63.63 437.70 0.39 6.94 -5.98 35.64 0.31 0.39 0.31 0.15 0.28 ABOVE
14 Kota Tebing Tinggi Sumut Western Part 6.98 0.99 60.44 0.10 118.24 -63.63 437.70 0.36 9.73 -5.98 35.64 0.38 0.36 0.38 0.10 0.28 ABOVE
15 Kab. Nagan Raya NAD Western Part 1.55 0.99 60.44 0.01 128.15 -63.63 437.70 0.38 11.03 -5.98 35.64 0.41 0.38 0.41 0.01 0.27 ABOVE
16 Kab. Banggai Sulteng Eastern Part 5.93 0.99 60.44 0.08 105.14 -63.63 437.70 0.34 9.16 -5.98 35.64 0.36 0.34 0.36 0.08 0.26 ABOVE
17 Kota Medan Sumut Western Part 25.68 0.99 60.44 0.42 15.12 -63.63 437.70 0.16 0.98 -5.98 35.64 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.42 0.25 ABOVE
18 Kota Denpasar Bali Western Part 26.06 0.99 60.44 0.42 2.57 -63.63 437.70 0.13 0.19 -5.98 35.64 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.42 0.23 ABOVE
19 Kota Semarang Jateng Western Part 23.56 0.99 60.44 0.38 8.85 -63.63 437.70 0.14 0.95 -5.98 35.64 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.38 0.23 ABOVE
20 Kota Blitar Jatim Western Part 14.69 0.99 60.44 0.23 31.37 -63.63 437.70 0.19 5.27 -5.98 35.64 0.27 0.19 0.27 0.23 0.23 ABOVE
21 Kab. Banyuasin Sumsel Western Part 1.82 0.99 60.44 0.01 136.72 -63.63 437.70 0.40 5.53 -5.98 35.64 0.28 0.40 0.28 0.01 0.23 ABOVE
22 Kota Yogyakarta Yogya Western Part 21.58 0.99 60.44 0.35 16.45 -63.63 437.70 0.16 1.42 -5.98 35.64 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.35 0.23 ABOVE
23 Kab. Tangerang Banten Western Part 17.16 0.99 60.44 0.27 31.98 -63.63 437.70 0.19 2.64 -5.98 35.64 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.27 0.22 ABOVE
24 Kota Jambi Jambi Western Part 11.74 0.99 60.44 0.18 58.16 -63.63 437.70 0.24 4.20 -5.98 35.64 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.18 0.22 ABOVE
25 Kota Tangerang Banten Western Part 19.60 0.99 60.44 0.31 17.41 -63.63 437.70 0.16 1.83 -5.98 35.64 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.31 0.22 ABOVE
26 Kab. Gresik Jatim Western Part 16.69 0.99 60.44 0.26 22.36 -63.63 437.70 0.17 2.71 -5.98 35.64 0.21 0.17 0.21 0.26 0.21 ABOVE
27 Kab. Timor Tengah Utara NTT Eastern Part 4.07 0.99 60.44 0.05 42.46 -63.63 437.70 0.21 9.72 -5.98 35.64 0.38 0.21 0.38 0.05 0.21 ABOVE
28 Kab. Pasir Kaltim Eastern Part 6.03 0.99 60.44 0.08 76.29 -63.63 437.70 0.28 4.86 -5.98 35.64 0.26 0.28 0.26 0.08 0.21 ABOVE
29 Kota Bitung Sulut Western Part 7.05 0.99 60.44 0.10 62.75 -63.63 437.70 0.25 5.22 -5.98 35.64 0.27 0.25 0.27 0.10 0.21 ABOVE
30 Kota Tegal Jateng Western Part 16.81 0.99 60.44 0.27 20.52 -63.63 437.70 0.17 1.82 -5.98 35.64 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.27 0.21 ABOVE
31 Kab. Pati Jateng Western Part 12.58 0.99 60.44 0.20 34.79 -63.63 437.70 0.20 3.47 -5.98 35.64 0.23 0.20 0.23 0.20 0.21 ABOVE
32 Kab. Sidoarjo Jatim Western Part 19.45 0.99 60.44 0.31 5.11 -63.63 437.70 0.14 0.94 -5.98 35.64 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.31 0.20 ABOVE
33 Kab. Rokan Hilir Riau Western Part 8.15 0.99 60.44 0.12 70.13 -63.63 437.70 0.27 3.32 -5.98 35.64 0.22 0.27 0.22 0.12 0.20 ABOVE
34 Kota Pekanbaru Riau Western Part 14.85 0.99 60.44 0.23 22.50 -63.63 437.70 0.17 2.42 -5.98 35.64 0.20 0.17 0.20 0.23 0.20 ABOVE
35 Kota Bengkulu Bengkulu Western Part 7.27 0.99 60.44 0.11 59.98 -63.63 437.70 0.25 4.53 -5.98 35.64 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.11 0.20 ABOVE
36 Kab. Pasuruan Jatim Western Part 10.58 0.99 60.44 0.16 26.18 -63.63 437.70 0.18 4.90 -5.98 35.64 0.26 0.18 0.26 0.16 0.20 ABOVE
37 Kota Malang Jatim Western Part 13.81 0.99 60.44 0.22 18.80 -63.63 437.70 0.16 3.22 -5.98 35.64 0.22 0.16 0.22 0.22 0.20 ABOVE
38 Kota Banjarmasin Kalsel Eastern Part 12.87 0.99 60.44 0.20 31.41 -63.63 437.70 0.19 2.81 -5.98 35.64 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.20 ABOVE
39 Kota Bandung Jabar Western Part 21.02 0.99 60.44 0.34 -3.80 -63.63 437.70 0.12 -0.22 -5.98 35.64 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.34 0.20 ABOVE
40 Kab. Lombok Timur NTB Eastern Part 8.30 0.99 60.44 0.12 44.71 -63.63 437.70 0.22 4.52 -5.98 35.64 0.25 0.22 0.25 0.12 0.20 ABOVE
41 Kota Bekasi Jabar Western Part 16.27 0.99 60.44 0.26 13.62 -63.63 437.70 0.15 1.46 -5.98 35.64 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.26 0.20 ABOVE
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42 Kab. Bogor Jabar Western Part 17.20 0.99 60.44 0.27 11.64 -63.63 437.70 0.15 0.85 -5.98 35.64 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.27 0.20 ABOVE
43 Kab. Tanah Laut Kalsel Eastern Part 7.50 0.99 60.44 0.11 55.10 -63.63 437.70 0.24 3.97 -5.98 35.64 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.11 0.20 ABOVE
44 Kab. Tabanan Bali Western Part 13.66 0.99 60.44 0.21 25.37 -63.63 437.70 0.18 2.07 -5.98 35.64 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.19 ABOVE
45 Kab. Batanghari Jambi Western Part 6.35 0.99 60.44 0.09 61.46 -63.63 437.70 0.25 4.00 -5.98 35.64 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.09 0.19 ABOVE
46 Kota Bogor Jabar Western Part 13.68 0.99 60.44 0.21 22.17 -63.63 437.70 0.17 1.99 -5.98 35.64 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.19 ABOVE
47 Kota Sibolga Sumut Western Part 6.56 0.99 60.44 0.09 53.37 -63.63 437.70 0.23 4.37 -5.98 35.64 0.25 0.23 0.25 0.09 0.19 ABOVE
48 Kab. Banjar Kalsel Eastern Part 5.32 0.99 60.44 0.07 46.45 -63.63 437.70 0.22 5.79 -5.98 35.64 0.28 0.22 0.28 0.07 0.19 ABOVE
49 Kab. Polewali Mamasa Sulsel Eastern Part 5.26 0.99 60.44 0.07 47.74 -63.63 437.70 0.22 5.43 -5.98 35.64 0.27 0.22 0.27 0.07 0.19 ABOVE
50 Kota Padang Sumbar Western Part 16.88 0.99 60.44 0.27 7.37 -63.63 437.70 0.14 0.64 -5.98 35.64 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.27 0.19 ABOVE
51 Kab. Nabire Papua Eastern Part 2.03 0.99 60.44 0.02 71.11 -63.63 437.70 0.27 5.74 -5.98 35.64 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.02 0.19 ABOVE
52 Kota Depok Jabar Western Part 12.21 0.99 60.44 0.19 27.91 -63.63 437.70 0.18 2.04 -5.98 35.64 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 ABOVE
53 Kab. Tuban Jatim Western Part 14.13 0.99 60.44 0.22 9.32 -63.63 437.70 0.15 2.09 -5.98 35.64 0.19 0.15 0.19 0.22 0.19 ABOVE
54 Kota Dumai Riau Western Part 5.09 0.99 60.44 0.07 43.43 -63.63 437.70 0.21 5.38 -5.98 35.64 0.27 0.21 0.27 0.07 0.19 ABOVE
55 Kab. Kotawaringin Timur Kalteng Eastern Part 12.45 0.99 60.44 0.19 23.45 -63.63 437.70 0.17 1.71 -5.98 35.64 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.18 ABOVE
56 Kota Pangkal Pinang Babel Western Part 9.28 0.99 60.44 0.14 33.45 -63.63 437.70 0.19 2.96 -5.98 35.64 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.14 0.18 ABOVE
57 Kota Banda Aceh NAD Western Part 4.39 0.99 60.44 0.06 48.87 -63.63 437.70 0.22 5.02 -5.98 35.64 0.26 0.22 0.26 0.06 0.18 ABOVE
58 Kota Gorontalo Gorontalo Eastern Part 9.13 0.99 60.44 0.14 38.64 -63.63 437.70 0.20 2.50 -5.98 35.64 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.14 0.18 ABOVE
59 Kota Makassar Sulsel Eastern Part 15.56 0.99 60.44 0.25 8.12 -63.63 437.70 0.14 0.45 -5.98 35.64 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.25 0.18 ABOVE
60 Kab. Sumba Timur NTT Eastern Part 5.84 0.99 60.44 0.08 27.82 -63.63 437.70 0.18 5.58 -5.98 35.64 0.28 0.18 0.28 0.08 0.18 ABOVE
61 Kab. Kotawaringin Barat Kalteng Eastern Part 10.82 0.99 60.44 0.17 21.40 -63.63 437.70 0.17 2.39 -5.98 35.64 0.20 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.18 ABOVE
62 Kab. Purworejo Jateng Western Part 7.43 0.99 60.44 0.11 20.08 -63.63 437.70 0.17 4.81 -5.98 35.64 0.26 0.17 0.26 0.11 0.18 ABOVE
63 Kab. Takalar Sulsel Eastern Part 4.36 0.99 60.44 0.06 50.43 -63.63 437.70 0.23 4.40 -5.98 35.64 0.25 0.23 0.25 0.06 0.18 ABOVE
64 Kab. Padang Pariaman Sumbar Western Part 6.54 0.99 60.44 0.09 42.54 -63.63 437.70 0.21 3.52 -5.98 35.64 0.23 0.21 0.23 0.09 0.18 ABOVE
65 Kab. Sumedang Jabar Western Part 11.37 0.99 60.44 0.17 20.04 -63.63 437.70 0.17 1.77 -5.98 35.64 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.18 ABOVE
66 Kab. Magelang Jateng Western Part 10.46 0.99 60.44 0.16 22.00 -63.63 437.70 0.17 2.20 -5.98 35.64 0.20 0.17 0.20 0.16 0.18 ABOVE
67 Kota Bukit Tinggi Sumbar Western Part 11.46 0.99 60.44 0.18 18.18 -63.63 437.70 0.16 1.52 -5.98 35.64 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.17 ABOVE
68 Kab. Sleman Yogya Western Part 12.52 0.99 60.44 0.19 13.46 -63.63 437.70 0.15 1.08 -5.98 35.64 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.17 ABOVE
69 Kota Manado Sulut Western Part 12.61 0.99 60.44 0.20 13.32 -63.63 437.70 0.15 1.01 -5.98 35.64 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.20 0.17 ABOVE
70 Kota Metro Lampung Western Part 6.25 0.99 60.44 0.09 32.53 -63.63 437.70 0.19 3.83 -5.98 35.64 0.24 0.19 0.24 0.09 0.17 ABOVE
71 Kota Ternate Maluku Utara Eastern Part 5.65 0.99 60.44 0.08 32.00 -63.63 437.70 0.19 4.15 -5.98 35.64 0.24 0.19 0.24 0.08 0.17 ABOVE
72 Kab. Serang Banten Western Part 12.82 0.99 60.44 0.20 9.87 -63.63 437.70 0.15 0.90 -5.98 35.64 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.20 0.17 ABOVE
73 Kab. Tapin Kalsel Eastern Part 6.40 0.99 60.44 0.09 31.31 -63.63 437.70 0.19 3.59 -5.98 35.64 0.23 0.19 0.23 0.09 0.17 ABOVE
74 Kota Pontianak Kalbar Eastern Part 12.36 0.99 60.44 0.19 11.03 -63.63 437.70 0.15 1.04 -5.98 35.64 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.17 ABOVE
75 Kab. Semarang Jateng Western Part 12.28 0.99 60.44 0.19 10.84 -63.63 437.70 0.15 1.11 -5.98 35.64 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.17 ABOVE
76 Kab. Lebak Banten Western Part 5.67 0.99 60.44 0.08 34.50 -63.63 437.70 0.20 3.76 -5.98 35.64 0.23 0.20 0.23 0.08 0.17 ABOVE
77 Kota Salatiga Jateng Western Part 12.80 0.99 60.44 0.20 7.12 -63.63 437.70 0.14 0.93 -5.98 35.64 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.17 ABOVE
78 Kab. Sinjai Sulsel Eastern Part 6.61 0.99 60.44 0.09 37.37 -63.63 437.70 0.20 2.65 -5.98 35.64 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.09 0.17 ABOVE
79 Kab. Lahat Sumsel Western Part 4.84 0.99 60.44 0.06 37.71 -63.63 437.70 0.20 3.63 -5.98 35.64 0.23 0.20 0.23 0.06 0.17 ABOVE
80 Kab. Boyolali Jateng Western Part 9.34 0.99 60.44 0.14 12.75 -63.63 437.70 0.15 2.48 -5.98 35.64 0.20 0.15 0.20 0.14 0.17 ABOVE
81 Kab. Pangkajene dan Kepulauan Sulsel Eastern Part 12.95 0.99 60.44 0.20 5.64 -63.63 437.70 0.14 0.52 -5.98 35.64 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.20 0.17 BELOW
82 Kab. Kudus Jateng Western Part 12.40 0.99 60.44 0.19 7.14 -63.63 437.70 0.14 0.76 -5.98 35.64 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.17 BELOW
83 Kab. Banjarnegara Jateng Western Part 8.88 0.99 60.44 0.13 21.02 -63.63 437.70 0.17 2.05 -5.98 35.64 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.13 0.16 BELOW
84 Kab. Ngada NTT Eastern Part 4.87 0.99 60.44 0.07 22.34 -63.63 437.70 0.17 4.66 -5.98 35.64 0.26 0.17 0.26 0.07 0.16 BELOW
85 Kab. Pekalongan Jateng Western Part 8.74 0.99 60.44 0.13 19.75 -63.63 437.70 0.17 2.14 -5.98 35.64 0.20 0.17 0.20 0.13 0.16 BELOW
86 Kab. Kupang NTT Eastern Part 9.64 0.99 60.44 0.15 11.25 -63.63 437.70 0.15 2.14 -5.98 35.64 0.20 0.15 0.20 0.15 0.16 BELOW
87 Kab. Banyumas Jateng Western Part 10.49 0.99 60.44 0.16 13.72 -63.63 437.70 0.15 1.18 -5.98 35.64 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.16 BELOW
88 Kab. Luwu Sulsel Eastern Part 4.77 0.99 60.44 0.06 38.71 -63.63 437.70 0.20 3.10 -5.98 35.64 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.06 0.16 BELOW
89 Kota Solok Sumbar Western Part 8.86 0.99 60.44 0.13 20.88 -63.63 437.70 0.17 1.64 -5.98 35.64 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.13 0.16 BELOW
90 Kota Balikpapan Kaltim Eastern Part 11.58 0.99 60.44 0.18 11.33 -63.63 437.70 0.15 0.49 -5.98 35.64 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.16 BELOW
91 Kab. Lampung Tengah Lampung Western Part 2.48 0.99 60.44 0.03 52.18 -63.63 437.70 0.23 3.37 -5.98 35.64 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.03 0.16 BELOW
92 Kab. Tanah Datar Sumbar Western Part 6.50 0.99 60.44 0.09 28.99 -63.63 437.70 0.18 2.41 -5.98 35.64 0.20 0.18 0.20 0.09 0.16 BELOW
93 Kab. Sambas Kalbar Eastern Part 3.99 0.99 60.44 0.05 35.14 -63.63 437.70 0.20 3.57 -5.98 35.64 0.23 0.20 0.23 0.05 0.16 BELOW
94 Kota Padang Panjang Sumbar Western Part 7.57 0.99 60.44 0.11 24.24 -63.63 437.70 0.18 1.93 -5.98 35.64 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.11 0.16 BELOW
95 Kota Jayapura Papua Eastern Part 6.26 0.99 60.44 0.09 33.47 -63.63 437.70 0.19 1.99 -5.98 35.64 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.09 0.16 BELOW
96 Kota Sukabumi Jabar Western Part 12.52 0.99 60.44 0.19 2.29 -63.63 437.70 0.13 0.17 -5.98 35.64 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.19 0.16 BELOW
97 Kab. Alor NTT Eastern Part 5.56 0.99 60.44 0.08 17.67 -63.63 437.70 0.16 3.56 -5.98 35.64 0.23 0.16 0.23 0.08 0.16 BELOW
98 Kota Sawahlunto Sumbar Western Part 8.38 0.99 60.44 0.12 17.03 -63.63 437.70 0.16 1.61 -5.98 35.64 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.12 0.16 BELOW
99 Kota Pekalongan Jateng Western Part 8.80 0.99 60.44 0.13 15.97 -63.63 437.70 0.16 1.34 -5.98 35.64 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.13 0.16 BELOW
100 Kota Pare-Pare Sulsel Eastern Part 9.78 0.99 60.44 0.15 11.63 -63.63 437.70 0.15 0.84 -5.98 35.64 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.15 BELOW
101 Kab. Karawang Jabar Western Part 11.76 0.99 60.44 0.18 2.68 -63.63 437.70 0.13 0.19 -5.98 35.64 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.18 0.15 BELOW
102 Kota Bandar Lampung Lampung Western Part 10.31 0.99 60.44 0.16 7.95 -63.63 437.70 0.14 0.75 -5.98 35.64 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.15 BELOW
103 Kab. Karanganyar Jateng Western Part 8.40 0.99 60.44 0.12 17.02 -63.63 437.70 0.16 1.27 -5.98 35.64 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.12 0.15 BELOW
104 Kab. Kampar Riau Western Part 4.95 0.99 60.44 0.07 37.54 -63.63 437.70 0.20 1.93 -5.98 35.64 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.07 0.15 BELOW
105 Kab. Subang Jabar Western Part 11.12 0.99 60.44 0.17 5.29 -63.63 437.70 0.14 0.24 -5.98 35.64 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.15 BELOW
106 Kab. Cianjur Jabar Western Part 7.04 0.99 60.44 0.10 22.10 -63.63 437.70 0.17 1.68 -5.98 35.64 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.10 0.15 BELOW
107 Kab. Lampung Barat Lampung Western Part 2.46 0.99 60.44 0.02 40.73 -63.63 437.70 0.21 3.32 -5.98 35.64 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.02 0.15 BELOW
108 Kab. Tabalong Kalsel Eastern Part 7.99 0.99 60.44 0.12 16.35 -63.63 437.70 0.16 1.38 -5.98 35.64 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.12 0.15 BELOW
109 Kab. Mojokerto Jatim Western Part 8.89 0.99 60.44 0.13 6.16 -63.63 437.70 0.14 1.37 -5.98 35.64 0.18 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.15 BELOW
110 Kab. Pelalawan Riau Western Part 2.86 0.99 60.44 0.03 45.76 -63.63 437.70 0.22 2.14 -5.98 35.64 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.03 0.15 BELOW
111 Kab. Lamongan Jatim Western Part 8.19 0.99 60.44 0.12 5.25 -63.63 437.70 0.14 1.29 -5.98 35.64 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.12 0.14 BELOW
112 Kab. Aceh Selatan NAD Western Part 1.73 0.99 60.44 0.01 33.39 -63.63 437.70 0.19 3.36 -5.98 35.64 0.22 0.19 0.22 0.01 0.14 BELOW
113 Kab. Tapanuli Tengah Sumut Western Part 3.34 0.99 60.44 0.04 32.99 -63.63 437.70 0.19 2.18 -5.98 35.64 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.04 0.14 BELOW
114 Kab. Hulu Sungai Selatan Kalsel Eastern Part 5.73 0.99 60.44 0.08 17.40 -63.63 437.70 0.16 1.72 -5.98 35.64 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.08 0.14 BELOW
115 Kab. Sumba Barat NTT Eastern Part 5.37 0.99 60.44 0.07 10.80 -63.63 437.70 0.15 2.48 -5.98 35.64 0.20 0.15 0.20 0.07 0.14 BELOW
116 Kab. Tanah Karo Sumut Western Part 3.86 0.99 60.44 0.05 22.96 -63.63 437.70 0.17 2.51 -5.98 35.64 0.20 0.17 0.20 0.05 0.14 BELOW
117 Kab. Madiun Jatim Western Part 6.48 0.99 60.44 0.09 6.90 -63.63 437.70 0.14 1.93 -5.98 35.64 0.19 0.14 0.19 0.09 0.14 BELOW
118 Kab. Jember Jatim Western Part 6.58 0.99 60.44 0.09 8.83 -63.63 437.70 0.14 1.70 -5.98 35.64 0.18 0.14 0.18 0.09 0.14 BELOW
119 Kab. Blora Jateng Western Part 7.82 0.99 60.44 0.11 9.64 -63.63 437.70 0.15 0.74 -5.98 35.64 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.11 0.14 BELOW
120 Kab. Tana Toraja Sulsel Eastern Part 6.06 0.99 60.44 0.09 13.97 -63.63 437.70 0.15 1.50 -5.98 35.64 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.09 0.14 BELOW
121 Kab. Lombok Barat NTB Eastern Part 7.63 0.99 60.44 0.11 9.32 -63.63 437.70 0.15 0.75 -5.98 35.64 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.11 0.14 BELOW
122 Kab. Ciamis Jabar Western Part 5.96 0.99 60.44 0.08 16.19 -63.63 437.70 0.16 1.29 -5.98 35.64 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.08 0.14 BELOW
123 Kab. Maros Sulsel Eastern Part 5.74 0.99 60.44 0.08 12.46 -63.63 437.70 0.15 1.74 -5.98 35.64 0.19 0.15 0.19 0.08 0.14 BELOW
124 Kota Palembang Sumsel Western Part 10.14 0.99 60.44 0.15 -3.05 -63.63 437.70 0.12 -0.23 -5.98 35.64 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.14 BELOW
125 Kab. Tegal Jateng Western Part 8.88 0.99 60.44 0.13 1.76 -63.63 437.70 0.13 0.16 -5.98 35.64 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.14 BELOW
126 Kab. Tulang Bawang Lampung Western Part 1.82 0.99 60.44 0.01 27.41 -63.63 437.70 0.18 2.93 -5.98 35.64 0.21 0.18 0.21 0.01 0.14 BELOW
127 Kab. Karimun Riau Western Part 16.82 0.99 60.44 0.27 -37.65 -63.63 437.70 0.05 -2.25 -5.98 35.64 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.27 0.14 BELOW
128 Kab. Timor Tengah Selatan NTT Eastern Part 7.45 0.99 60.44 0.11 4.06 -63.63 437.70 0.14 0.78 -5.98 35.64 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.11 0.14 BELOW
129 Kab. Sukoharjo Jateng Western Part 6.61 0.99 60.44 0.09 8.89 -63.63 437.70 0.14 0.90 -5.98 35.64 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.09 0.13 BELOW
130 Kab. Jepara Jateng Western Part 12.26 0.99 60.44 0.19 -12.05 -63.63 437.70 0.10 -1.38 -5.98 35.64 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.19 0.13 BELOW
131 Kab. Barru Sulsel Eastern Part 5.34 0.99 60.44 0.07 14.59 -63.63 437.70 0.16 1.14 -5.98 35.64 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.07 0.13 BELOW
132 Kab. Kapuas Kalteng Eastern Part 4.13 0.99 60.44 0.05 17.99 -63.63 437.70 0.16 1.64 -5.98 35.64 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.05 0.13 BELOW
133 Kab. Tanggamus Lampung Western Part 2.58 0.99 60.44 0.03 24.70 -63.63 437.70 0.18 2.15 -5.98 35.64 0.20 0.18 0.20 0.03 0.13 BELOW
134 Kab. Ketapang Kalbar Eastern Part 3.84 0.99 60.44 0.05 18.98 -63.63 437.70 0.16 1.70 -5.98 35.64 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.05 0.13 BELOW
135 Kab. Tanjung Jabung Barat Jambi Western Part 7.81 0.99 60.44 0.11 3.69 -63.63 437.70 0.13 0.13 -5.98 35.64 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.13 BELOW
136 Kab. Bandung Jabar Western Part 8.71 0.99 60.44 0.13 -1.26 -63.63 437.70 0.12 -0.10 -5.98 35.64 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.13 BELOW
137 Kab. Bone Sulsel Eastern Part 5.10 0.99 60.44 0.07 10.89 -63.63 437.70 0.15 1.35 -5.98 35.64 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.07 0.13 BELOW
138 Kab. Bungo Jambi Western Part 9.87 0.99 60.44 0.15 -7.74 -63.63 437.70 0.11 -0.48 -5.98 35.64 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.13 BELOW
139 Kab. Lampung Utara Lampung Western Part 2.99 0.99 60.44 0.03 21.10 -63.63 437.70 0.17 1.93 -5.98 35.64 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.03 0.13 BELOW
140 Kab. Kuantan Singingi Riau Western Part 3.17 0.99 60.44 0.04 29.98 -63.63 437.70 0.19 1.03 -5.98 35.64 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.04 0.13 BELOW
141 Kota Palangka Raya Kalteng Eastern Part 5.23 0.99 60.44 0.07 12.53 -63.63 437.70 0.15 1.02 -5.98 35.64 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.07 0.13 BELOW
142 Kab. Sidenreng Rappang Sulsel Eastern Part 6.07 0.99 60.44 0.09 7.53 -63.63 437.70 0.14 0.81 -5.98 35.64 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.09 0.13 BELOW
143 Kab. Karangasem Bali Western Part 7.77 0.99 60.44 0.11 1.28 -63.63 437.70 0.13 0.12 -5.98 35.64 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.13 BELOW
144 Kota Samarinda Kaltim Eastern Part 8.77 0.99 60.44 0.13 -3.76 -63.63 437.70 0.12 -0.22 -5.98 35.64 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.13 BELOW
145 Kab. Temanggung Jateng Western Part 6.37 0.99 60.44 0.09 5.34 -63.63 437.70 0.14 0.48 -5.98 35.64 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.09 0.13 BELOW
146 Kota Tanjung Balai Sumut Western Part 6.32 0.99 60.44 0.09 6.68 -63.63 437.70 0.14 0.39 -5.98 35.64 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.09 0.13 BELOW
147 Kab. Batang Jateng Western Part 7.26 0.99 60.44 0.11 1.30 -63.63 437.70 0.13 0.17 -5.98 35.64 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.13 BELOW
148 Kota Kendari Sultra Eastern Part 7.13 0.99 60.44 0.10 1.58 -63.63 437.70 0.13 0.08 -5.98 35.64 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.10 0.13 BELOW
149 Kab. Ende NTT Eastern Part 4.12 0.99 60.44 0.05 8.09 -63.63 437.70 0.14 1.61 -5.98 35.64 0.18 0.14 0.18 0.05 0.13 BELOW
150 Kab. Musi Rawas Sumsel Western Part 3.38 0.99 60.44 0.04 16.92 -63.63 437.70 0.16 1.28 -5.98 35.64 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.04 0.13 BELOW
151 Kab. Majalengka Jabar Western Part 5.90 0.99 60.44 0.08 6.02 -63.63 437.70 0.14 0.41 -5.98 35.64 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.08 0.13 BELOW
152 Kab. Asahan Sumut Western Part 5.75 0.99 60.44 0.08 6.41 -63.63 437.70 0.14 0.46 -5.98 35.64 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.08 0.12 BELOW
153 Kab. Rembang Jateng Western Part 6.53 0.99 60.44 0.09 2.30 -63.63 437.70 0.13 0.25 -5.98 35.64 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.09 0.12 BELOW
154 Kota Bau-Bau Sultra Eastern Part 4.77 0.99 60.44 0.06 11.76 -63.63 437.70 0.15 0.65 -5.98 35.64 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.06 0.12 BELOW
155 Kab. Tasikmalaya Jabar Western Part 4.12 0.99 60.44 0.05 10.40 -63.63 437.70 0.15 1.12 -5.98 35.64 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.05 0.12 BELOW
156 Kab. Ngawi Jatim Western Part 6.37 0.99 60.44 0.09 1.05 -63.63 437.70 0.13 0.23 -5.98 35.64 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.09 0.12 BELOW
157 Kota Bontang Kaltim Eastern Part 4.15 0.99 60.44 0.05 13.01 -63.63 437.70 0.15 0.52 -5.98 35.64 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.05 0.12 BELOW
158 Kab. Jeneponto Sulsel Eastern Part 2.87 0.99 60.44 0.03 13.00 -63.63 437.70 0.15 1.42 -5.98 35.64 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.03 0.12 BELOW
159 Kab. Kapuas Hulu Kalbar Eastern Part 2.41 0.99 60.44 0.02 8.18 -63.63 437.70 0.14 2.13 -5.98 35.64 0.19 0.14 0.19 0.02 0.12 BELOW
160 Kab. Barito Utara Kalteng Eastern Part 4.67 0.99 60.44 0.06 5.57 -63.63 437.70 0.14 0.72 -5.98 35.64 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.06 0.12 BELOW
161 Kab. Muara Enim Sumsel Western Part 7.05 0.99 60.44 0.10 -3.02 -63.63 437.70 0.12 -0.25 -5.98 35.64 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.10 0.12 BELOW
162 Kab. Bantul Yogya Western Part 7.76 0.99 60.44 0.11 -6.40 -63.63 437.70 0.11 -0.55 -5.98 35.64 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.12 BELOW
163 Kab. Enrekang Sulsel Eastern Part 5.83 0.99 60.44 0.08 0.32 -63.63 437.70 0.13 0.03 -5.98 35.64 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.08 0.12 BELOW
164 Kab. Barito Selatan Kalteng Eastern Part 2.93 0.99 60.44 0.03 14.48 -63.63 437.70 0.16 0.87 -5.98 35.64 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.03 0.12 BELOW
165 Kab. Brebes Jateng Western Part 5.41 0.99 60.44 0.07 1.77 -63.63 437.70 0.13 0.16 -5.98 35.64 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.07 0.12 BELOW
166 Kota Langsa NAD Western Part 1.79 0.99 60.44 0.01 16.17 -63.63 437.70 0.16 1.40 -5.98 35.64 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.01 0.12 BELOW
167 Kab. Agam Sumbar Western Part 4.61 0.99 60.44 0.06 4.45 -63.63 437.70 0.14 0.36 -5.98 35.64 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.06 0.12 BELOW
168 Kab. Lampung Selatan Lampung Western Part 3.25 0.99 60.44 0.04 9.02 -63.63 437.70 0.14 0.92 -5.98 35.64 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.04 0.12 BELOW
169 Kab. Malang Jatim Western Part 6.30 0.99 60.44 0.09 -2.07 -63.63 437.70 0.12 -0.39 -5.98 35.64 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.09 0.12 BELOW
170 Kota Binjai Sumut Western Part 4.90 0.99 60.44 0.07 2.36 -63.63 437.70 0.13 0.17 -5.98 35.64 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.07 0.12 BELOW
171 Kab. Wonogiri Jateng Western Part 5.99 0.99 60.44 0.08 -2.72 -63.63 437.70 0.12 -0.34 -5.98 35.64 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.08 0.11 BELOW
172 Kab. Klungkung Bali Western Part 5.80 0.99 60.44 0.08 -2.62 -63.63 437.70 0.12 -0.22 -5.98 35.64 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.08 0.11 BELOW
173 Kab. Gowa Sulsel Eastern Part 7.04 0.99 60.44 0.10 -9.26 -63.63 437.70 0.11 -0.62 -5.98 35.64 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.11 BELOW
174 Kab. Aceh Utara NAD Western Part 5.18 0.99 60.44 0.07 0.67 -63.63 437.70 0.13 -0.21 -5.98 35.64 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.07 0.11 BELOW
175 Kab. Pontianak Kalbar Eastern Part 3.06 0.99 60.44 0.03 6.63 -63.63 437.70 0.14 0.75 -5.98 35.64 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.03 0.11 BELOW
176 Kab. Barito Kuala Kalsel Eastern Part 4.76 0.99 60.44 0.06 0.01 -63.63 437.70 0.13 0.00 -5.98 35.64 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.06 0.11 BELOW
177 Kab. Bangkalan Jatim Western Part 5.40 0.99 60.44 0.07 -1.46 -63.63 437.70 0.12 -0.39 -5.98 35.64 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.07 0.11 BELOW
178 Kab. Wajo Sulsel Eastern Part 6.63 0.99 60.44 0.09 -8.37 -63.63 437.70 0.11 -0.94 -5.98 35.64 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.11 BELOW
179 Kab. Cirebon Jabar Western Part 7.22 0.99 60.44 0.10 -9.94 -63.63 437.70 0.11 -1.35 -5.98 35.64 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 BELOW
180 Kab. Bima NTB Eastern Part 6.06 0.99 60.44 0.09 -8.38 -63.63 437.70 0.11 -0.67 -5.98 35.64 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.11 BELOW
181 Kab. Kendal Jateng Western Part 7.98 0.99 60.44 0.12 -14.80 -63.63 437.70 0.10 -1.54 -5.98 35.64 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.11 BELOW
182 Kab. Landak Kalbar Eastern Part 1.07 0.99 60.44 0.00 9.71 -63.63 437.70 0.15 1.25 -5.98 35.64 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.00 0.11 BELOW
183 Kab. Kutai Barat Kaltim Eastern Part 5.03 0.99 60.44 0.07 -4.97 -63.63 437.70 0.12 -0.32 -5.98 35.64 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.07 0.11 BELOW
184 Kab. Indragiri Hilir Riau Western Part 4.66 0.99 60.44 0.06 -4.55 -63.63 437.70 0.12 -0.15 -5.98 35.64 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.06 0.11 BELOW
185 Kab. Sukabumi Jabar Western Part 5.19 0.99 60.44 0.07 -7.52 -63.63 437.70 0.11 -0.56 -5.98 35.64 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.07 0.10 BELOW
186 Kab. Belu NTT Eastern Part 4.26 0.99 60.44 0.05 -2.48 -63.63 437.70 0.12 -0.41 -5.98 35.64 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.05 0.10 BELOW
187 Kab. Sikka NTT Eastern Part 4.47 0.99 60.44 0.06 -4.13 -63.63 437.70 0.12 -0.78 -5.98 35.64 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.10 BELOW
188 Kab. Kebumen Jateng Western Part 6.14 0.99 60.44 0.09 -11.88 -63.63 437.70 0.10 -1.31 -5.98 35.64 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.10 BELOW
189 Kab. Kulon Progo Yogya Western Part 6.37 0.99 60.44 0.09 -17.49 -63.63 437.70 0.09 -1.52 -5.98 35.64 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.10 BELOW
190 Kab. Hulu Sungai Tengah Kalsel Eastern Part 5.76 0.99 60.44 0.08 -12.06 -63.63 437.70 0.10 -1.57 -5.98 35.64 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.10 BELOW
191 Kab. Bangli Bali Western Part 4.03 0.99 60.44 0.05 -7.12 -63.63 437.70 0.11 -0.77 -5.98 35.64 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.05 0.10 BELOW
192 Kab. Sangihe Talaud Sulut Eastern Part 4.28 0.99 60.44 0.06 -9.17 -63.63 437.70 0.11 -0.90 -5.98 35.64 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.10 BELOW
193 Kab. Jembrana Bali Western Part 4.59 0.99 60.44 0.06 -12.04 -63.63 437.70 0.10 -1.14 -5.98 35.64 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.06 0.09 BELOW
194 Kab. Banyuwangi Jatim Western Part 7.53 0.99 60.44 0.11 -13.56 -63.63 437.70 0.10 -3.18 -5.98 35.64 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.09 BELOW
195 Kab. Yapen Waropen Papua Eastern Part 1.60 0.99 60.44 0.01 -1.79 -63.63 437.70 0.12 -0.21 -5.98 35.64 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.01 0.09 BELOW
196 Kab. Bondowoso Jatim Western Part 5.94 0.99 60.44 0.08 -12.21 -63.63 437.70 0.10 -2.46 -5.98 35.64 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.09 BELOW
197 Kab. Selayar Sulsel Eastern Part 2.67 0.99 60.44 0.03 -7.61 -63.63 437.70 0.11 -0.68 -5.98 35.64 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.03 0.09 BELOW
198 Kab. Majene Sulsel Eastern Part 1.96 0.99 60.44 0.02 -7.21 -63.63 437.70 0.11 -0.85 -5.98 35.64 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.02 0.08 BELOW
199 Kab. Aceh Tenggara NAD Western Part 2.39 0.99 60.44 0.02 -12.96 -63.63 437.70 0.10 -0.78 -5.98 35.64 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.02 0.08 BELOW
200 Kab. Soppeng Sulsel Eastern Part 3.44 0.99 60.44 0.04 -16.52 -63.63 437.70 0.09 -1.26 -5.98 35.64 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.04 0.08 BELOW
201 Kab. Indramayu Jabar Western Part 4.64 0.99 60.44 0.06 -26.34 -63.63 437.70 0.07 -1.44 -5.98 35.64 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.06 0.08 BELOW
202 Kab. Simalungun Sumut Western Part 3.62 0.99 60.44 0.04 -18.71 -63.63 437.70 0.09 -1.93 -5.98 35.64 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.04 0.08 BELOW
203 Kab. Dompu NTB Eastern Part 4.03 0.99 60.44 0.05 -19.12 -63.63 437.70 0.09 -2.21 -5.98 35.64 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.08 BELOW
204 Kab. Tanjung Jabung Timur Jambi Western Part 2.77 0.99 60.44 0.03 -19.47 -63.63 437.70 0.09 -1.33 -5.98 35.64 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.03 0.08 BELOW
205 Kab. Tapanuli Selatan Sumut Western Part 2.46 0.99 60.44 0.02 -17.00 -63.63 437.70 0.09 -1.67 -5.98 35.64 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.02 0.07 BELOW
206 Kota Lhokseumawe NAD Western Part 4.98 0.99 60.44 0.07 -23.57 -63.63 437.70 0.08 -3.01 -5.98 35.64 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 BELOW
207 Kab. Situbondo Jatim Western Part 4.58 0.99 60.44 0.06 -16.16 -63.63 437.70 0.09 -3.85 -5.98 35.64 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.07 BELOW
208 Kab. Pesisir Selatan Sumbar Western Part 2.98 0.99 60.44 0.03 -24.11 -63.63 437.70 0.08 -2.41 -5.98 35.64 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.07 BELOW
209 Kota Lubuk Linggau Sumsel Western Part 4.59 0.99 60.44 0.06 -34.29 -63.63 437.70 0.06 -2.86 -5.98 35.64 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.06 BELOW
210 Kab. Lima Puluh Kota Sumbar Western Part 4.32 0.99 60.44 0.06 -41.36 -63.63 437.70 0.04 -3.43 -5.98 35.64 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.05 BELOW
211 Kab. Muaro Jambi Jambi Western Part 3.46 0.99 60.44 0.04 -51.11 -63.63 437.70 0.02 -2.68 -5.98 35.64 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.05 BELOW
212 Kota Magelang Jateng Western Part 6.44 0.99 60.44 0.09 -52.04 -63.63 437.70 0.02 -5.98 -5.98 35.64 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.04 BELOW
213 Kab. Musi Banyuasin Sumsel Western Part 1.79 0.99 60.44 0.01 -60.26 -63.63 437.70 0.01 -2.81 -5.98 35.64 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.03 BELOW
214 Kab. Halmahera Tengah Maluku Utara Eastern Part 2.08 0.99 60.44 0.02 -63.63 -63.63 437.70 0.00 -5.50 -5.98 35.64 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 BELOW
0.17AVERAGE IFA
